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INTRODUCTION
The business of providing adjudication services for international
commercial disputes—whether through courts, arbitration, or alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) mechanisms—is a growth industry. London and New York
have long been go-to forums for international commercial litigation in court.1
The traditional top choices for arbitral seats include London, Paris, New York,
†

Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. For helpful conversations, I am grateful to Jane
Baron, John Coyle, Courtney Cox, Matthew Erie, Mark Feldman, Susan Finder, Maggie Gardner, Craig
Green, Mitu Gulati, Clare Huntington, Rebecca Ingber, Alyssa King, Eva Lein, David Noll, Rachel
Rebouche, Danya Reda, Greg Reilly, Marta Requejo Isidro, Giesela Rühl, Aaron Simowitz, Paul
Stephan, and participants in the Roundtable on Judicial Administration/Judicial Process at Duke Law
School, the Junior International Law Scholars Association Workshop at Brooklyn Law School, and the
International Business Law Scholars’ Roundtable at Brooklyn Law School. Chelsey Dawson, Jessica
Henschel, John Lucas Varney, and Corinne Zucker provided excellent research assistance.
1
John MacKenzie, UK: Competition For Commercial Disputes Around The World, MONDAQ (Mar. 4, 2019),
http://www.mondaq.com/uk/x/785390/Arbitration+Dispute+Resolution/Competition+For+Commercial+
Disputes+Around+The+World.
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and Geneva, homes to “the oldest and most popular arbitral institutions.”2
Reflecting the commonly cited refrain that most international commercial
disputes go to arbitration, there has also been growth and innovation in
arbitration centers and in arbitration-friendly domestic laws.3
A recent phenomenon has disrupted this traditional picture. States
around the world are establishing international commercial courts: Englishlanguage-friendly domestic courts specializing in international commercial
disputes. In the past sixteen years, Dubai (2004), Qatar (2009), Singapore (2015),
Abu Dhabi (2015), Kazakhstan (2018), and China (2018) have all opened
specialized courts focusing on international commercial disputes.4 Since the
Brexit vote in 2015, this phenomenon has also appeared in Europe: Germany,5
France,6 the Netherlands,7 Belgium,8 and Switzerland9 have all either recently
opened or considered plans to open new courts or court branches specifically
dedicated to international commercial disputes. Other countries are also

2

The Seat of Arbitration in International Commercial Arbitration, ACERIS LAW (Aug. 11, 2017),
https://www.acerislaw.com/seat-arbitration-international-commercial-arbitration/.
3
Serge Gravel, Partner, FLV & Associés, Remarks at International Arbitration Roundtable (June 2018)
(transcript available at Financier Worldwide, https://www.financierworldwide.com/roundtableinternational-arbitration-jun18#.XS4DTC_Mxok).
4
See Matthew Erie, The New Legal Hubs: The Emergent Landscape of International Commercial
Dispute Resolution, 59 VA. J. INT’L L. 225 (2020) [hereinafter Erie, The New Legal Hubs]; Nicolás
Álvaro Zambrana-Tévar, The Court of the Astana International Financial Center in the Wake of Its
Persian Gulf Predecessors, 12 ERASMUS L. REV. 122 (2019). Abu Dhabi’s new commercial court
handles both domestic and international commercial disputes. See Abu Dhabi to Set Up New
Commercial Court, TRADEARABIA (Sept. 14, 2019),
http://www.tradearabia.com/news/MISC_358611.html.
5
Burkhard Hess & Timon Boerner, Chambers for International Commercial Disputes in Germany: The
State of Affairs, 12 ERASMUS L. REV. 33, 33 (2019).
6
Alexandre Biard, International Commercial Courts in France: Innovation Without Revolution?, 12
ERASMUS L. REV. 24, 24 (2019); Emmanuel Gaillard, Yas Banifatemi & Chloe Vialard, The
International Chambers of the Paris Courts and Their Innovative Rules of Procedure, SHEARMAN &
STERLING (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.shearman.com/perspectives/2018/04/paris-courts-and-theirinnovative-rules-of-procedure.
7
Eddy Bauw, Commercial Litigation in Europe in Transformation: The Case of the Netherlands
Commercial Court, 12 ERASMUS L. REV. 15, 15 (2019); NETH. COM. CT.,
https://www.rechtspraak.nl/English/NCC/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2020).
8
Guillaume Croisant, The Belgian Government Unveils Its Plan for the Brussels International Business
Court (BIBC), KLUWER ARB. BLOG (June 25, 2018),
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/06/25/the-belgian-government-unveils-its-plan-forthe-brussels-international-business-court-bibc/ (indicating a planned opening in 2020). In March 2019,
the Belgian Parliament rejected the proposal and the BIBC is now at a standstill. See Geert Van Calster,
The Brussels International Business Court–Council of State Continues to Resist, GAVC LAW (Mar. 21,
2019), https://gavclaw.com/2018/11/14/the-brussels-international-business-court-council-of-statecontinues-to-resist/; Matthias Verbergt, Controversiële ‘kaviaarrechtbank’ van Geens wordt begraven,
DE STANDAARD (March 21, 2019), http://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20190321_04272272. Proponents
are still hopeful the court will be established. See Erik Peetermans & Philippe Lambrecht, The Brussels
International Business Court: Initial Overview and Analysis, 12 ERASMUS L. REV. 42 (2019).
9
Natalija Matic, Switzerland: In the Pipeline: Zurich International Commercial Court, MONDAQ (Oct.
13, 2018),
http://www.mondaq.com/x/745118/international+trade+investment/In+The+Pipeline+Zurich+Internatio
nal+Commerical+Court (discussing consideration of an international commercial court in Switzerland).
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contemplating opening new international commercial courts or judicial divisions
dedicated to international commercial disputes.10
International commercial courts are not international courts. They are
domestic courts whose subject matter jurisdiction is limited to, or focuses on,
international commercial disputes. These courts add to, and are intended to
complement, their home States’ international commercial dispute resolution
offerings. These States do not embrace litigation instead of arbitration; rather,
they simultaneously have “litigation-friendly” international commercial courts
and “arbitration-friendly” legal regimes that are favorably inclined toward
arbitration clauses and deferential in their recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards.11 These courts present themselves as innovative, cost effective,
and responsive to typical criticisms of courts. For example, they often have
experienced foreign jurists or other experts as judges, incorporate ADR, and
allow parties to opt-out of regular domestic law procedures, resulting in courts
that offer something of a hybrid of litigation and arbitration.12
Scholars, mostly outside the United States, are beginning to notice these
courts. Several articles describe some subset of these new courts and discuss their
10

See, e.g., James M. Claxton et al., Developing Japan as a Regional Hub for International Dispute
Resolution: Dream Come True or Daydream?, 24 J. OF JAPANESE L. 109 (2019); Marta Requejo Isidro,
International Commercial Courts in the Litigation Market 5 n.4 (Max Planck Inst. Lux. Procedural L.
Research Paper Series, No. 2019 (2), 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3327166 (describing discussions in Spain about
opening an international commercial court) [hereinafter Requejo Isidro]; John Balouziyeh, Judicial
Reform in Saudi Arabia: Recent Developments in Arbitration and Commercial Litigation, KLUWER
ARB. BLOG (Dec. 31, 2017), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2017/12/31/judicial-reformsaudi-arabia-recent-developments-arbitration-commercial-litigation; Reem Shamseddine, Saudi Arabia
sets up Commercial Courts to Expedite Investment, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-court/saudi-arabia-sets-up-commercial-courts-to-expediteinvestment-idUSKBN1CL2DT; The Honorable Justice John Middleton, The Rise of the International
Commercial Court, FED. CT. OF AUSTL. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.fedcourt.gov.au/digital-lawlibrary/judges-speeches/justice-middleton/middleton-j-20180921 (discussing “numerous appeals for an
international commercial court to be established in Australia”); Andrew Stephenson, Lindsay Hogan, &
Jaclyn L Smith, Australia: Is an International Commercial Court for Australia a Viable Option?,
MONDAQ (June 27, 2016),
http://www.mondaq.com/australia/x/504084/International+Courts+Tribunals/Is+an+international+comm
ercial+court+for+Australia+a+viable+option (“If Australia wants to compete with the likes of Singapore
and Hong Kong for a slice of the international commercial disputes resolution market, then it makes
sense to establish an international commercial court in Australia.”).
11
See Michael Hwang, Commercial Courts And International Arbitration—Competitors Or Partners?,
31 ARB. INT’L 193, 194 (2015) (defining “arbitration-friendly”). See also Pamela K. Bookman, The
Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1119 (2019) (discussing what it means to be
arbitration-friendly) [hereinafter Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox]. The full meaning of
“arbitration-friendly” policies can be difficult to discern. See, e.g., George A. Bermann, What Does It
Mean To Be “Pro-Arbitration”?, 34 ARB. INT’L 341 (2018); William W. Park, Arbitration and Fine
Dining: Two Faces of Efficiency, in THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF AN ARBITRATOR: LIBER AMICORUM
PIERRE A. KARRER 251 (Patricia Shaughnessy & Sherlin Tung eds., 2017) (discussing trade-offs among
different arbitration-friendly goals); Nobumichi Teramura, Luke R. Nottage & James Morrison,
International Commercial Arbitration in Australia: Judicial Control over Arbitral Awards, (Sydney
Law School Research Paper No. 19/24, 2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3379494 (discussing Australia’s efforts to become
more “arbitration-friendly”).
12
For a discussion of a subset of these courts as arbitration-litigation hybrids, see Pamela K. Bookman,
Arbitral Courts, 61 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Bookman, Arbitral Courts].
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capacity to compete with arbitration13 or with the London Commercial Court.14
More recently, entire volumes have been devoted to exploring the inner workings
of these courts and speculating about their ability to attract cases.15
This Article takes on the received narrative that competition with
arbitration to provide the best dispute resolution mechanism has been the primary
driving force behind the creation of these courts. It argues that this narrative is
mistaken and incomplete.
To the extent that competition is driving the creation of these courts, the
competitive forces at work may not be entirely positive or efficient. Moreover,
there are explanations for these courts beyond competition: the proliferation of
international commercial courts is also a result of particular domestic political
economies and other forces. Studying these courts and the forces driving their
creation can generate important insights into critical debates about courts,
international commercial dispute resolution, and the relationship between courts
and arbitration.
This Article offers four main contributions. The first is descriptive: the
Article offers a typology of international commercial courts that tracks what
appear to be the primary reasons why these courts have come to be.
Second, this Article seeks to correct and shape the current conversation
about international commercial courts as an emerging source of positive,
efficient competition with arbitration. Long before the rise of international
commercial courts, scholars have argued and assumed that competition for forum
selection in contracts is an efficient competitive force. That is, such competition
is supposed to drive a “race to the top” for tribunals to develop the best, most

13

See, e.g., Dalma Demeter & Kayleigh M. Smith, The Implications of International Commercial
Courts on Arbitration, 33 J. INT’L ARB. 441, 441 (2016) [hereinafter Demeter & Smith]; Erie, The New
Legal Hubs, supra note 4 (placing international commercial courts in the context of emerging legal hubs
in Asia and surrounding areas); Andrew Godwin, International Commercial Courts: The Singapore
Experience, 18 MELB. J. INT’L L. 219, 222 (2017) [hereinafter Godwin]; Requejo Isidro, supra note 10;
Firew Tiba, The Emergence of Hybrid International Commercial Courts and the Future of Cross Border
Commercial Dispute Resolution in Asia, 14 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 31, 32 (2016) [hereinafter Tiba];
Janet Walker, Specialized International Courts: Keeping Arbitration on Top of Its Game, 85 ARB. 2
(2019) [hereinafter Walker]; Stephan Wilske, International Commercial Courts and Arbitration —
Alternatives, Substitutes or Trojan Horse?, 11 CONTEMPORARY ASIA ARB. J. 153 (2018) [hereinafter
Wilske]. For an example of a U.S. scholar examining these courts from a U.S. perspective, see S.I.
Strong, International Commercial Courts and the United States: An Outlier by Choice and by
Constitutional Design?, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COURTS – A EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 255 (Xandra Kramer & John Sorabji eds., 2019) [hereinafter Strong].
14
See, e.g., Xandra Kramer & John Sorabji, International Business Courts in Europe and Beyond: A
Global Competition for Justice?, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COURTS – A EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 1 (Xandra Kramer & John Sorabji eds., 2019); Giesela Rühl, Judicial Cooperation in Civil
and Commercial Matters After Brexit: Which Way Forward?, 67 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 99 (2018)
[hereinafter Rühl, Judicial Cooperation]; DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES OF THE
UNION, BUILDING COMPETENCE IN COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE MEMBER STATES 43 (Sept. 2018),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/604980/IPOL_STU(2018)604980_EN.pdf.
15
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COURTS – A EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Xandra
Kramer & John Sorabji eds., 2019); 12 ERASMUS L. REV. 1–135 (2019) (a collection of Articles
pertaining to international commercial courts).
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efficient procedures to resolve disputes.16 The nascent literature on the rise of
international commercial courts likewise often relies on these assumptions as a
jumping-off point, describing international commercial courts as competing with
arbitration by combining the best of both worlds (litigation and arbitration).17
This account is incomplete. These courts emerge not from some
idealistic desire to perfect courts, but from a confluence of different local and
international forces. Some courts have appeared because localities want to
become new legal hubs for dispute resolution—providing not only new courts,
but a forum hospitable to litigation, arbitration, and other forms of ADR (not
necessarily focused on generating substantive law).18 Singapore, for example,
recently created an international commercial court to complement its rising
prominence in arbitration and as a regional economic hub.19 Some international
commercial courts can emerge as aspiring litigation destinations without a
parallel emphasis on arbitration or other kinds of ADR, as appears to be the case
in Amsterdam, for example.20 Other locations, such as Dubai, Qatar, and
Kazakhstan, have created special economic zones and view courts with dispute
resolution expertise as an integral part of attracting investment and capital to
those zones.21 Finally, China’s aim seems keyed to exercising control over Belt
and Road disputes,22 although it may have broader, longer-term goals as well.23
It is important to pay attention to the driving forces behind international
commercial courts because these goals will likely shape the courts’ development.
Moreover, over time, these courts’ success may be judged domestically by
metrics tied to these driving goals. These metrics will lead to decisions about,
for example, whether governments will continue to fund the courts. Investmentminded courts will be deemed a success if they help expand investment; aspiring
litigation destinations will be judged by the size of their dockets; China may
judge its new court by its global influence or by other metrics.
It is possible that achieving these results might coincide with positive
perceptions of the courts’ quality, fairness, or cost-effectiveness. But it might
not. Instead, courts might achieve these results in other ways, such as by catering
16

See, e.g., Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 243 (2016) (“Forum
selling in contractual settings may be beneficial. When sophisticated parties use forum-selection clauses
to choose the forum in their contracts, they have an incentive to choose a forum that provides unbiased,
efficient adjudication because doing so maximizes the value of their transaction.”); Robert E. Scott &
George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. (2006).
17
See, e.g., Tiba, supra note 13, at 32 (describing the SICC as a “hybrid institution [that] promises to
combine the best of international commercial arbitration and that of judicial settlement of disputes”).
18
See Erie, The New Legal Hubs, supra note 4, at 49 (“[New legal hubs] compete on the quality of their
legal services and procedural efficiency, rather than, necessarily, supplying the law itself.”).
19
See infra Section II.B.1.
20
See infra Section II.B.2.
21
See infra Section II.A.
22
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) includes a “vast collection of development and investment
initiatives” launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, that “would stretch from East Asia to Europe,
significantly expanding China’s economic and political influence.” Andrew Chatzky & James McBride,
China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative.
23
See infra Section II.C.
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to certain constituencies or by expanding their jurisdiction. As the scholarship
on corporate law has shown, probing the “race to the top” analogy reveals a more
complicated picture than first appears.24 While there is much to celebrate about
the innovation of international commercial courts, these complicated dynamics
also recommend watching them closely to see how they develop. A goal of this
Article is to begin a line of scholarship that celebrates these courts’ potential and
helps avoid their worst outcomes.
International commercial courts also offer insight into a second, related
theme in scholarship about the relationship between arbitration and litigation.
U.S. courts often portray arbitration and litigation as stark alternatives, with the
former as parties’ favorite for resolving disputes arising out of international
commercial contracts. As I have argued elsewhere, this dichotomy is
overblown.25 The new international commercial courts both bolster this
argument and challenge the conventional story in a new way. For example,
international commercial courts often borrow procedural devices, like partydriven design and confidentiality, that are typically thought to be characteristics
distinguishing arbitration from litigation. These courts therefore explode
assumptions about inherent differences between arbitration and litigation and
undermine assumptions commonly made by U.S. courts that being proarbitration requires being hostile to litigation.26
Finally, international commercial courts offer an important perspective
on scholarly debates about whether parties really do prefer arbitration, as is
widely assumed. The increased supply of international courts suggests that there
may be a demand for them, frustrating accounts that arbitration has replaced
litigation as the dispute resolution mechanism of choice in international
commercial contracts. On the other hand, supply does not prove demand. If it
turns out that these courts attract few cases over time, that study, too, could
inform understandings of what parties want from dispute resolution and what
courts are capable of.
Part I provides a background understanding of the differences between
courts, commercial courts, and international commercial courts. Part II canvases
the recent growth of international commercial courts around the globe. It sets
forth a typology for understanding the emergence of these courts based on the
forces driving their creation. Part III discusses the importance of this changing
adjudication business landscape for understanding the law market and other
forces that may be driving the rise of international commercial courts. Part IV
investigates these courts’ lessons for scholarship about the relationship between
litigation and arbitration and parties’ preferences. Part V celebrates the potential
24

See William J. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. L. REV. 1403 (2020) (discussing the
corporate law debates).
25
See Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, supra note 11.
26
In a companion piece, I explore the idea of courts that seek to act like arbitral tribunals and the
questions of legitimacy and public access that such “arbitral courts” raise. See Bookman, Arbitral
Courts, supra note 12. See also Hiro Aragaki, The Metaphysics of Arbitration: A Reply to Hensler and
Khatam, 18 NEV. L. J. 541 (2018) [hereinafter Aragaki, Metaphysics] (discussing international
commercial courts as hybrids in the context of identifying the “essence” of arbitration).
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of international commercial courts but also warns against the dangers of them
catering excessively to either State or private interests.
I.

COURTS, COMMERCIAL COURTS, AND INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL COURTS

To understand the significance of the new international commercial
courts, it is important to know what came before them. This Part explains the
difference between courts of general jurisdiction, commercial courts, and
international commercial courts. It also profiles London’s and New York’s
commercial courts. These examples typify the “old school” prototype of
international commercial courts, which were simply domestic commercial courts
that specialized in hearing business disputes and that were particularly open to
foreign parties.
In U.S. law schools, students are usually introduced to two main types
of courts: state and federal. State courts are courts of general subject-matter
jurisdiction—that is, state courts can hear any kind of dispute (other than those
over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction). Federal courts, by
contrast, are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction. Those limits are
defined by Article III of the Constitution and statutes such as the diversity and
federal question statutes,27 which grant federal court jurisdiction over disputes
involving parties from different states and that involve high amounts in
controversy, or disputes that “arise under” federal law. Within those constraints,
however, federal courts hear disputes involving a wide variety of subject matters,
from torts to civil rights to antitrust. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
correspondingly, are “transsubstantive,” with rules that supposedly apply equally
no matter the substance (or subject matter) of the dispute.28
There are a variety of ways, however, in which states can organize their
court systems. While the federal courts do so only rarely,29 state courts often
specialize in certain subject matter areas, such as traffic court or family court or
probate court. One area of court specialization is business or commercial
disputes. An early example of such specialization appeared in 1895, when the
Queen’s Bench in London created the London Commercial Court.30 In 1993,
New York (along with Illinois) started a U.S. trend and established a Commercial
Division to focus on commercial disputes with high amounts in controversy.31

27

28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–32 (2006).
See, e.g., David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law, 2013 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1191 (2014) (exploring and defending the principle of transsubstantivity); but see J. Maria Glover,
The Supreme Court’s “Non‐Transsubstantive” Class Action, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1625 (2017) (arguing
that the Supreme Court’s class action cases apply differently in different substantive contexts).
29
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit specializes in patent and
certain other subject matters.
30
Wilske, supra note 13, at 160.
31
John F. Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1918
(2012) [hereinafter Coyle, Business Courts].
28
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Several other U.S. states and States around the world have created business
courts since then.32
International commercial courts, the focus of this Article, are in some
ways a natural extension of specialized commercial courts. The “old school”
approach to having a court that catered to international commercial disputes was
to have a high quality domestic court available to locals but also welcoming to
foreign parties and attractive to them by virtue of the courts’ expertise,
efficiency, and broad jurisdiction, among other characteristics. The “old school”
international commercial courts—London and New York—have both also been
creators of widely consumed substantive law.33 They have become the premier
courts chosen through choice-of-forum clauses, the premier seats of arbitrations,
and often the premier source of substantive law chosen through choice-of-law
clauses.34 For over a hundred years, London and New York have also been
hospitable not only to international commercial litigation but also to arbitration.
Some background on the London and New York courts is useful for
understanding the innovation of the new wave of international commercial
courts. For a long time, the London Commercial Court was the prototypical—
and indeed only—example of an old school international commercial court. Over
time, that chamber became recognized for its judges’ business sophistication,
independence, and respect for the rule of law, as well as for its development of
English law (and the flexible, but predictable, common law system) and its
welcoming attitude toward foreign litigants.35 The London Commercial Court is
particularly attractive to foreign parties because of its broad concept of
jurisdiction,36 flexible procedural rules designed to accommodate complex
commercial cases,37 and proclivity toward compelling parties to disclose

32

Id. See also About Us, SIFOCC, https://www.sifocc.org/about-us/ (last visited March 4, 2020).
See, e.g., Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 17–18, 35–36 (2008) (discussing New York’s development of contract law aimed at making it
more predictable and therefore more attractive as a choice for international commercial disputes);
Geoffrey P. Miller & Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2073, 2087
(2009).
34
See generally Miller & Eisenberg, supra note 33 (discussing New York); Stefan Vogenauer,
Regulatory Competition Through Choice of Contract Law and Choice of Forum in Europe: Theory and
Evidence, 21 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 13 (2013) (discussing Europe).
35
See generally EVA LEIN ET AL., U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, FACTORS INFLUENCING INTERNATIONAL
LITIGANTS’ DECISIONS TO BRING COMMERCIAL CLAIMS TO THE LONDON BASED COURTS (2015),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/39634
3/factors-influencing-international-litigants-with-commercial-claims.pdf.
36
See Delphine Nougayrede, Outsourcing Law in Post-Soviet Russia, 3 J. EURASIAN L. 383, 395–400
(2015) (discussing Russian oligarchs’ use of U.K. courts and law); JUDICIARY OF ENGLAND & WALES,
THE COMMERCIAL COURT REPORT 2017–2018 6 (2019), https://www.judiciary.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2019/02/6.5310_Commercial-Courts-Annual-Report_v3.pdf (“The jurisdiction of the
Commercial Court is wide. It extends to any claim relating to the transaction of trade and commerce
(including commercial agreements, import and export, carriage of goods by sea, land and air, banking
and financial services, insurance and reinsurance, markets and exchanges, commodities, oil, gas and
natural resources, the construction of ships, agency, arbitration and competition matters).”) [hereinafter
COMMERCIAL COURT REPORT 2017–2018].
37
See, e.g., COMMERCIAL COURT REPORT 2017–2018, supra note 36, at 16 (discussing opportunities for
“shorter and flexible trials”); Robin Byron, Update on Dispute Resolution in England and Wales:
Evolution or Revolution, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1297, 1301 (2001).
33
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documents beyond standard disclosures.38 The Commercial Court boasts a 60%
settlement rate.39 It also offers expedited and expert procedures for cases that
qualify for the “Financial List” by having more than £50 million in dispute and
relating to financial markets.40
Related to the attractiveness of London’s courts is the attractiveness of
the English language and English law. English, the “global language of
business,” is one of the most widely spoken languages in the world.41 English
law, likewise, enjoys a favorable reputation around the globe. It has been the
most commonly selected law to govern business contracts within the EU.42 It is
sought after for its familiarity, stability, and predictability, as well as its
reputation for fairness and efficiency.43 The doctrine of precedent offers
predictability but also flexibility to adapt to the modern business world.44 English
law is also quite favorable towards enforcing contracts.45
These features attract a large quantity of international cases. The U.K.’s
Justice Department advertises both U.K. courts and U.K. law as an important
export.46 In 2015, “63% of disputes at the [London] Commercial Court involved
foreign nationals,”47 and “52% of the contracts drafted in English in the Middle
East and North Africa chose London as the seat of jurisdiction for disputes.”48
London’s embrace of international commercial litigation coexists with
an embrace of arbitration. London hosts one of the most popular commercial

38

Byron, supra note 37, at 1301.
COMMERCIAL COURT REPORT 2017–2018, supra note 36, at 10.
The Financial List: Resolving Financial Markets Disputes in London, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT,
(Nov. 2015), https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/0ee0087d/the-financiallist-resolving-financial-markets-disputes-in-london.
41
Tsedal Neeley, Global Business Speaks English, HARV. BUS. REV. (May 2012),
https://hbr.org/2012/05/global-business-speaks-english.
42
DEP’T FOR EXITING THE EU, HM GOV’T, PROVIDING A CROSS-BORDER CIVIL JUDICIAL
COOPERATION FRAMEWORK: A FUTURE PARTNERSHIP PAPER 4 (2017),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/63927
1/Providing_a_cross-border_civil_judicial_cooperation_framework.pdf.
43
See Vogenauer, supra note 34.
44
See generally COURTS & TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, LEGALUK: THE STRENGTH OF ENGLISH LAW AND
THE UK JURISDICTION (2017), https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/legaluk-strengthof-english-law-draft-4-FINAL.pdf. See also Hwang, supra note 11, at 198–200 (discussing benefits of
common law).
45
See generally COURTS & TRIBUNALS JUDICIARY, supra note 44.
46
THE LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND AND WALES, ENGLAND AND WALES: THE JURISDICTION OF CHOICE
5 (2007), http://www.evershedssutherland.com/documents/LawSocietyEnglandAndWalesJurisdictionOfChoice.pdf (“The Ministry of
Justice is committed to supporting the legal sector’s success on the international stage. I am therefore
delighted to introduce this brochure by the Law Society promoting England and Wales as the
jurisdiction of choice for the resolution of disputes arising all over the world.”); see also Introduction,
LCIA, https://www.lcia.org/LCIA/introduction.aspx (last visited March 4, 2020).
47
Wilske, supra note 13, at 160 (citing Adam Sanitt, The Financial List: Resolving Financial Markets
Disputes in London, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Nov. 2015),
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/134005/the-financial-list-resolvingfinancial-markets-disputes-in-london).
48
Requejo Isidro, supra note 10, at 8.
39
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arbitration centers, the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA),49 and
London is one of the most popular choices for seating arbitrations, regardless of
which arbitration center administers the arbitration.50 U.K. law liberally supports
arbitration. In 1996, Parliament revised the Arbitration Act, modeling it after the
UNCITRAL Modern Rules for Arbitration,51 which require courts to support
arbitration and limit judicial interference.52 At the same time, U.K. courts are
strongly committed to openness, for example, by allowing non-parties to access
court documents.53
Like London, New York is also a popular choice for designation in both
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses. While London dominates the
European market, New York law and New York City dominate choice-of-law
and choice-of-forum designations in the Americas.54 Like English law, New
York law is widely respected and often selected to govern contracts even when
the particular business relationship has little or no connection to New York. Also
like English law, its value resonates in the common-law tradition. New York law
is also respected for its stability and predictability, as well as its flexibility, and
it is thought to be generally favorable to business interests and contract
enforcement.55 In a study of contracts filed with the SEC, New York was
designated as the forum in 34% of the studied domestic contracts and 45% of the
international ones.56

49

QUEEN MARY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, 2018 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: THE
EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2 (2018),
http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/media/arbitration/docs/2018-International-Arbitration-Survey---TheEvolution-of-International-Arbitration-(2).PDF [hereinafter QMUL 2018 survey].
50
See Loukas A. Mistelis, Arbitral Seats: Choices and Competition, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG
(Nov. 26, 2010), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2010/11/26/arbitral-seats-choices-andcompetition/.
51
Byron, supra note 37, at 1316.
52
The previous Arbitration Act had permitted appeals of questions of law from arbitration to the courts.
The 1996 law ended that practice. Id. at 1316–18.
53
Cape Intermediate Holdings v. Dring (for and on behalf of Asbestos Victims Support Groups Forum
UK) [2019] UKSC 38, [34] (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)).
54
LEIN ET AL., supra note 35, at 27. Notably, many of the studies of emerging international commercial
courts and legal hubs cite London as both the inspiration and primary competition for the new courts.
See, e.g., Erie, The New Legal Hubs, supra note 4 (placing international commercial courts in the
context of emerging legal hubs in Asia and surrounding areas); Requejo Isidro, supra note 10; Tiba,
supra note 13, at 37; Godwin, supra note 13, at 222; Walker, supra note 13; Wilske, supra note 13. For
an example of a U.S. scholar examining these courts from a U.S. perspective, see Strong, supra note 13.
The few scholars to consider the U.S. role in the growing market for international commercial dispute
resolution do not emphasize the importance of New York compared to other states, which have far less
developed commercial courts and often focus on domestic rather than international disputes. See Strong,
supra note 13. But New York has the distinction both of having a widely used substantive law and of
being a popular litigation destination. See Miller & Eisenberg, supra note 33; Julian Nyarko, Stickiness
and Incomplete Contracting: Explaining the Lack of Forum Selection Clauses in Commercial
Agreements, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 15),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3446206 [hereinafter Nyarko, Stickiness]; Julian
Nyarko, We’ll See You in . . . Court! The Lack of Arbitration Clauses in International Commercial
Contracts, 58 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 6, 13 (2019) [hereinafter Nyarko, The Lack of Arbitration
Clauses].
55
See generally Miller & Eisenberg, supra note 33; Sarath Sanga, Choice of Law: An Empirical
Analysis, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 894 (2014).
56
Nyarko, The Lack of Arbitration Clauses, supra note 54, at 7.
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Most international commercial disputes heard in New York end up in
federal court because the parties are diverse or foreign and their disputes have a
high amount in controversy. The Southern District of New York—the federal
trial level court that sits in Manhattan—is well respected for the competence,
neutrality, and legal expertise of its judges.57
In 1993, almost one hundred years after the establishment of the London
Commercial Court, New York established its own Commercial Division. New
York’s state courts have long also been “extraordinarily receptive to enforcing
contracts that select New York as the provider of law or forum, even in cases
where there are few or no other connections between New York and the contract
or the parties.”58 In the Manhattan Commercial Division, disputes must be in
excess of $500,000.59 For cases that may have no other connection to New York,
New York statutes grant jurisdiction over all cases relating to any contract worth
over $1 million where foreigners designate New York in their choice-of-law and
choice-of-forum clauses.60 These statutes were enacted in response to New York
Bar Association committee reports recommending “affirmative measures to
attract foreign business by providing ready access to a competent forum for
dispute resolution” and to compete with other international business centers.61
New York courts vigorously enforce arbitration clauses, forum-selection clauses,
and choice-of-law clauses.62
The Commercial Division prides itself on its flexibility and efficiency.
For example, under Rule 9, the parties may choose “accelerated procedures” that
promise to end proceedings within nine months and require parties to waive a
number of procedural rights and defenses, including the right to a jury trial, to
recover punitive damages, and to interlocutory appeal.63
57

See JOHN D. WINTER & RICHARD MAIDMAN, RETELLING THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK (2012),
https://www.pbwt.com/content/uploads/2015/07/NYLitigator-Summer2012-History-SDNY-1043294_2_.pdf.
58
Miller & Eisenberg, supra note 33, at 2087; Vogenauer, supra note 34, at 44 (“Today, New York law
and New York courts are widely regarded as being particularly sophisticated and mature and as being
perceptive to business in general and the financial industry in particular.”). Interestingly, Julian Nyarko
has documented a “striking lack of choice-of-forum provisions in commercial contracts” filed with the
SEC. Nyarko, Stickiness, supra note 54, at 1.
59
N.Y. Ct. R. § 202.70(a) (2018).
60
N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-1402 (McKinney 1984) (parties may agree to have disputes arising under a
contract resolved in New York, if: (a) the value of the contract is at least $1 million; and (b) the parties
agree to submit to personal jurisdiction in New York); see, e.g., IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A. v. Inepar
Inv.s, S.A., 20 N.Y.3d. 310, 315 (2012); Hemlock Semiconductor Pte. Ltd. v. Jinglong Indus. &
Commerce Grp. Co., Ltd., 56 Misc.3d 324, 326–27 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017); Bristol Inv. Fund Ltd. v. ID
Confirm, Inc., 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 7549, *6–7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
61
Miller & Eisenberg, supra note 33, at 2091; Committee on Foreign and Comparative Law, Proposal
for Mandatory Enforcement of Governing-Law Clauses and Related Clauses in Significant Commercial
Agreements, 38 RECORD OF THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 537, 537 (1983).
62
See, e.g., Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 77 N.Y.2d 225, 233 (1990) (citing Cooper v. Ateliers de la
Motobecane, S.A., 57 N.Y.2d 408 (1982)) (“[I]t is the policy in New York to encourage resolution of
disputes through arbitration, particularly conflicts arising in the context of international commercial
transactions.”); see also Miller & Eisenberg, supra note 33, at 2089–90.
63
N.Y. COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 202.70(9) (1965). When parties choose these accelerated
procedures, they are deemed to have waived a number of procedural rights, including the right to a jury
trial and the right to interlocutory appeal. Id. § 202.70(9)(c).
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Inspired by the London Commercial Court’s “Financial List” for cases
over £50 million, New York also recently opened a “Large Complex Case List”
for disputes over $50 million, which opens opportunities for special procedures,
including the use of special referees for discovery or settlement.64 The
Commercial Division continues to innovate in other ways as well.65 These efforts
have led the Commercial Division to dramatically improve resolution time for
cases and dramatically increase the number of cases that settle before trial.66
The New York Commercial Division also has various provisions
permitting documents to remain confidential.67 But while “confidentiality orders
have become a routine part of commercial litigation,” the Commercial Division
polices parties’ requests for confidentiality for excess or abuse. In a recent
decision, the court sanctioned Google for aggressively over-designating
documents as confidential.68
In addition to promoting itself as a go-to forum for international
commercial litigation, New York also strives to “signal to the international
business community New York’s commitment to the efficient resolution of court
proceedings that relate to international arbitration.”69 New York has “engaged in
vigorous efforts to attract” adjudication business—both in courts and in
arbitration—for much of the last century.70
London and New York are thus “old school” examples of international
commercial courts. They are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction,
specializing in commercial disputes including, but not limited to, disputes with
international elements. They do not quite deserve the name of “international
commercial courts” because they are domestic courts that will hear entirely
domestic disputes. But they do make themselves attractive to international
commercial disputes, even for controversies with little or no connection to them.
64

Stephen P. Younger & Muhammad U. Faridi, Top 10 New York Commercial Division Cases and
Developments of 2017, PATTERSON BELKNAP LLP (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.pbwt.com/nycommercial-division-blog/top-10-new-york-commercial-division-cases-and-developments-of-2017.
65
Effective October 1, 2018, for example, two new rule amendments encourage parties to use
technology assisted review in discovery and to seek immediate trials on early dispositive issues. Patrick
G. Rideout & Giyoung Song, New York’s Commercial Division Continues Its Efforts to Increase
Efficiencies, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b04dcf9f94c4-43c8-845d-43cb4675f1a0.
66
Danya Shocair Reda & Nicholas Frayn, Global Dimensions of Court Reform (unpublished
manuscript), at 19 (draft on file with Author) [hereinafter Reda & Frayn]. Moreover, “New York has
positioned itself as an attractive forum for resolution of international commercial disputes, with flexible
rules permitting contracting parties to agree to procedures specific to their needs. That choice works best
for parties who take the necessary time in advance to negotiate not only choice of forum, but also the
procedural mechanisms of their choice.” Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, International Commercial Litigation
in New York, N.Y. L. J. (Oct. 9, 2018),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/10/09/international-commercial-litigation-in-newyork/?slreturn=20181027165420.
67
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3103(a) (McKinney 2013).
68
See Callsome Solutions v. Google, 2018 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4852 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018); Thomas J.
Hall & Judith A. Archer, Use and Abuse of Confidentiality Orders, N.Y. L.J. (Dec. 20, 2018),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/12/20/use-and-abuse-of-confidentialityorders/?slreturn=20190113131625.
69
Reda & Frayn, supra note 66, at 28 (quoting Advisory Council Report on Rules Changes).
70
Miller & Eisenberg, supra note 33, at 2079–87; Reda & Frayn, supra note 66.
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Part of that attractiveness is closely tied up in the attractiveness of the substantive
law, English and New York law, respectively, that they apply and develop.
II.

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL COURTS

Over the last fifteen years, a growing number of States around the world
have looked to build on the London—and, to some extent, the New York—
example and establish a domestic court that caters specifically to international
commercial disputes, limiting jurisdiction to cases that qualify as both
“commercial” and “international.” These courts tend to be English-languagefriendly, receptive to common-law procedures and substantive law, and
technologically state-of-the-art. Many incorporate desirable characteristics of
arbitration, for example, by allowing confidentiality and customized
procedures.71 Unlike London and New York, these new courts distinguish
themselves “on the quality of their legal services and procedur[es], rather than,
necessarily, supplying the [substantive] law itself.”72
While several studies examine the growth of international commercial
courts as a unified global phenomenon,73 this Part describes three categories of
international commercial courts.74 The first category includes investmentseeking courts, such as Qatar and Dubai, which were established to attract
investment into the country and the region. Second, Singapore and the European
courts purport to be striving to become gold-standards and go-to forums in their
regions for international commercial dispute resolution. I dub these “litigation
destinations.” Litigation destinations usually, but need not, exist in a local legal
environment that tries to be friendly to litigation as well as arbitration. The third
category considers China’s new international commercial court, aimed to be a
one-stop-shop for all international commercial dispute resolution needs, focused
on resolving disputes arising out of its investments in the Belt and Road
Initiative.75 This last type of court has unique potential for global influence.
71

This study is not meant to be exhaustive (nor could it be, as new international commercial courts seem
to be appearing all the time). This Article focuses on new courts or court divisions established in the
twenty-first century that specifically target international commercial disputes to illustrate how the rise of
these courts challenges many common assumptions about international commercial dispute resolution.
Other categories of courts exhibit some parallel traits. For example, Ireland currently has a commercial
court open to domestic and international disputes; the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and the British Virgin
Islands have recently opened commercial divisions that specialize in disputes involving companies
incorporated in those jurisdictions. See Moon, supra note 24, at 1438.
72
Erie, The New Legal Hubs, supra note 4, at 54.
73
See Demeter & Smith, supra note 13; Godwin, supra note 13; Requejo Isidro, supra note 10, Tiba,
supra note 13; Wilske, supra note 13.
74
“International” here describes the subject matter jurisdiction of these courts—their jurisdiction
specializes in and can be limited to transnational commercial disputes. Some are also international
insofar as they employ foreign jurists, allow foreign lawyers to practice before them, incorporate foreign
law and procedures different from local courts, and operate in a foreign language (usually English). See
Walker, supra note 13, at 4; Georgia Antonopoulou, Defining International Disputes –Reflections on the
Netherlands Commercial Court Proposal, 2018 NEDERLANDS INTERNATIONAAL PRIVAATRECHT 740
(2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3380321 (discussing the definition of
“international” for the purposes of defining jurisdiction of such courts).
75
The Belt and Road Initiative aims to improve regional cooperation and connectivity on a transcontinental scale. Belt and Road Initiative, THE WORLD BANK (March 29, 2018),

240

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 45: 2

A. Investment-Minded Courts
Some international commercial courts have developed in light of a deep
local need for foreign investment and a desire to attract international commerce
and capital.76 Localities in Qatar, Dubai and Abu Dhabi in the United Arab
Emirates, and Astana (now Nur-Sultan) in Kazakhstan, have established
financial centers and free-trade zones, complete with a full menu of international
commercial dispute resolution options, including international commercial
courts, to reassure foreign investors and the international financial world that
their local investments will be protected. These jurisdictions have erected new,
state-of-the-art facilities. They build on existing best practices in international
commercial dispute resolution, providing a hospitable forum for both litigation
and arbitration with well-respected, international judges. They hire British and
other foreign experts to design their procedures and institutions and to serve as
judges. Especially at first, their innovations primarily came in the form of
transplanting English judicial practices and often English judges themselves.
This Section profiles the international commercial courts established in
Qatar and Dubai, the oldest investment-minded courts. The newer examples—
the Court of the Astana International Financial Center (AIFC) in Kazakhstan,77
and the Abu Dhabi Global Market Courts (ADGMC)78—follow a similar model,
establishing English-language, common-law-based courts that employ foreign
jurists, are friendly to arbitration, and seek to establish themselves as state-ofthe-art dispute resolution centers to attract foreign investment and assure
international constituencies of their legitimacy. These courts do not advertise
themselves as litigation destinations for all global disputes; rather, they may seek
to repatriate disputes involving locals and prevent them from going to London
or elsewhere.79
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/brief/belt-and-road-initiative. The goal is to
strengthen infrastructure, trade, and investment links between China and 65 other countries. Id.
Together, they will account for over 30 percent of global GDP, 62 percent of the population, and 75
percent of known energy resources. Efem Nkam Ubi, How Africa Benefits China, STRATFOR (July 2,
2019).
76
The establishment of international commercial courts to attract foreign direct investment likely works
better than U.S. state business courts’ attempts to create business courts to attract out-of-state companies
to relocate or do more business in a particular state. See Coyle, Business Courts, supra note 31, at 1940
(explaining irrelevance of business court availability to business location decisions).
77
Erie, The New Legal Hubs, supra note 4; Nicolás Álvaro Zambrana-Tévar, The Court of the Astana
International Financial Center in the Wake of Its Persian Gulf Predecessors (Dec. 31, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=3308296 (the Astana financial center and court are
modeled after Dubai; the first chief justice of the AIFC court was Lord Woolf, former Lord Chief
Justice of England and Wales); AIFC Court and IAC “eJustice” Launch, AIFC (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://aifc.kz/press-relizy/aifc-court-and-iac-ejustice-launch/; Yerbolat Uatkhanov, AIFC Court, IAC
Consider Five Cases in 2019, ASTANA TIMES (Jan. 5, 2020), https://astanatimes.com/2020/01/aifccourt-iac-consider-five-cases-in-2019/ (“Our dispute resolution is quick, accessible, cost effective,
impartial and, above all, incorruptible.”).
78
Wilske, supra note 13, at 165; Walker, supra note 13, at 6 (“ADGM Courts are largely based on the
English judicial system with a physical and electronic registry that supports their operations and
hearings in Abu Dhabi and around the world.”).
79
See, e.g., Frances Gibb, The Times, UK Judges Head New Court in Kazakhstan, EMBASSY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN IN THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND
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Interestingly, as these courts gain prominence and acceptance, they can
become regional legal hubs and shift their focus from providing stability and
predictability to cultivating flexibility and adapting to modern challenges. Aside
from the old school international commercial courts, the Qatar and Dubai courts,
as “teenagers,” are the oldest courts discussed in this Article. Their track record
demonstrates that the difference between being an investment-minded court and
an aspiring litigation destination can be fluid. But it also shows that international
commercial courts can serve multiple masters and be designed to further multiple
goals.
1. Qatar
In 2005, Qatar established the Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) to attract
international investment to the country.80 The QFC creates a legislative
framework to protect entities established in the QFC from the operation of
ordinary Qatar law (with the exception of the criminal law). The laws aim to be
business- and user-friendly to encourage foreign direct investment in Qatar. For
example, they guarantee QFC entities the ability to repatriate profits and to be
owned by foreigners. These reforms replaced the former dual legal framework,
which had separate courts for Muslim Qataris and for non-Muslim foreigners.
The QFC also includes the Qatar International Court and Dispute
Resolution Centre, also known as the Qatar International Court (QIC).81 The
QIC’s jurisdiction is limited to international commercial disputes. The court’s
official mission is “to provide a world-class international court and dispute
resolution Centre.” The QIC’s promotional materials state that it strives “to be
recognized as the world’s leading forum for the resolution of international civil
and commercial disputes.”82 Nevertheless, scholars describe the original impetus
for creating the court as promoting investment and demonstrating stability.83
The QIC is open to claims regardless of their connection with Qatar if
the parties choose the QIC in their contract.84 It aims to be a state-of-the-art
dispute resolution center that incorporates many of the most desirable features
of the London model. The QIC operates in English (although parties can request
to have proceedings in Arabic).85 It follows common law procedures,86 and
(Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.mfa.gov.kz/en/london/content-view/uk-judges-head-new-court-inkazakhstan (“Woolf accepts that a ‘very small number’ of cases that would have gone to London might
now go to the new court. ‘But it does not detract from our commercial court; on the contrary, it
promotes it in a part of the world that doesn't have that tradition.’”).
80
Zain Al Abdin Sharar & Mohammed Al Khulaifi, The Courts in Qatar Financial Centre and Dubai
International Financial Centre: A Comparative Analysis, 46 H.K. L. J. 529, 533 (2016).
81
See The Court Overview, QATAR INTERNATIONAL COURT AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTRE,
https://www.qicdrc.gov.qa/court-overview-0 (last visited March 4, 2020).
82
Wilske, supra note 13, at 164.
83
Sharar & Al Khulaifi, supra note 80, at 533.
84
Requejo Isidro, supra note 10, at 9.
85
Walker, supra note 13, at 7.
86
“It is now accepted that the most understood and accepted jurisdiction in relation to commercial
matters is the common law jurisdiction. As a result, any financial centre which seeks international
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parties can choose the substantive law applicable to their claims. The judges
include some Qatari judges and some retired judges from common and civil law
countries.87 Decisions are typically unappealable and confidential proceedings
are available for “good reason.”88
Notably, Qatar sees the importance of the QIC as not only providing a
fair, unbiased, sophisticated courts system operating in English and based in
common law, but also a center for multiple kinds of dispute resolution, including
arbitration. In 2017, it enacted a new arbitration law89 based on the UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. This change should make
Qatar more “arbitration friendly” and a generally more attractive location for
dispute resolution.90
The QIC itself offers judges as well as arbitrators and arbitration
facilities. Parties can select the QIC as an arbitral seat, as the court administers
arbitrations as well, and the judges may separately serve as arbitrators.91 The
court aims to be a one-stop shop for all international commercial dispute
resolution needs.92 Unusually, the QIC charges no fees.93
There appear to be no available statistics on the number of cases the QIC
has heard or the number of contracts designating the QIC as the forum.94 Existing
data suggests that some QIC proceedings took one to two years, suffering from
inefficiencies with respect to appointing experts and setting deadlines for expert
reports.95 The recent addition of an eCourt, the QICDRC Case Management
System, may address some of these issues.96

recognition and participation has no choice but to consider a dispute resolution regulatory structure
which is based on the common law. A regulatory regime based on the common law by necessity implies
that it will be English speaking because the main proponents of the common law are English speakers.”
Sharar & Al Khulaifi, supra note 80, at 539.
87
Sharar & Al Khulaifi, supra note 80, at 534; Walker, supra note 13, at 7; Wilske, supra note 13, at
163–64; The Court Overview, QATAR INT’L CT. AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION CTR.,
https://www.qicdrc.gov.qa/the-courts/overview (last visited Mar. 4, 2020) (listing judges from the U.K.,
South Africa, Singapore, Cyprus, and other countries).
88
The Qatar Financial Centre Civil and Commercial Court: Regulations and Procedural Rules, QATAR
INT’L CT. AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION CTR. (Dec. 15, 2010), art. 28.3,
https://www.qicdrc.gov.qa/sites/default/files/s3/wysiwyg/qfc_civil_and_commercial_court_regulations_
date_of_issuance_15_december_2010_0.pdf.
89
Law No. 2 of 2017 Promulgating the Civil and Commercial Arbitration Law, QATAR INT’L CT. AND
DISPUTE RESOLUTION CTR (Feb. 16, 2017)
https://www.qicdrc.com.qa/sites/default/files/law_no._02_2017_promulgating_the_civil_and_commerci
al_arbitration_law.pdf.
90
White & Case, The Role of the English Courts Post Brexit: Emerging Challengers?, JD SUPRA (Oct.
31, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-role-of-the-english-courts-post-26537/ [hereinafter
The Role of English Courts Post Brexit].
91
Walker, supra note 13, at 7.
92
Wilske, supra note 13, at 164–165.
93
Id.
94
Requejo Isidro, supra note 10, at 10.
95
Id.
96
Id.
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2. Dubai
Dubai, the most populous emirate in the United Arab Emirates, opened
the Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC) in 2004 to be “a hub for
institutional finance and . . . a regional express way for capital and investment.”97
It became fully operational in 2006.98 Like Qatar’s financial center, the DIFC
establishes a business-friendly legal jurisdiction for international investment that
protects foreign companies from the local Shari’a law (enforced in Arabic) that
would otherwise govern commerce in Dubai. Establishing this free zone required
a UAE constitutional amendment.99 Dubai hired prominent British law firms to
draft the DIFC legislation.100 These new rules were modeled on the London
Commercial Court’s, but with some revisions—for example, replacing British
evidence rules with the International Bar Association rules of evidence for
arbitration.101
The DIFC has its own court system as well as an arbitration center. The
DIFC Courts have six foreign judges and three Emirati judges.102 The DIFC
proclaims that its laws are based on global best practices in international
financial and commercial law.103 It operates under an English-language,
common-law-based legal structure. The parties can choose the substantive law
applicable to their claims and the background law is local “DIFC law,” which is
“the result of legislation and common law decisions.”104 The DIFC has a liberal
approach to allowing proceedings to be held confidentially,105 and its courts are
“set up to promote settlement”106: over 90% of cases settle before final
judgment.107
In 2011, the DIFC Court removed the requirement that disputes have
physical connections to Dubai, and recognized consent-based jurisdiction if the
parties agreed pre- or post-dispute.108 According to Jayanth Krishnan, this
development emboldened the DIFC court judges to broaden their interpretation
97

Sharar & Al Khulaifi, supra note 80, at 536. See also Erie, The New Legal Hubs, supra note 4, at 32
(describing Dubai’s efforts to “repatriate Middle Eastern money,” “secure FDI and encourage
international banks to lend in Dubai,” including opening the DIFC courts).
98
Requejo Isidro, supra note 10, at 9–10.
99
Erie, The New Legal Hubs, supra note 4, at 36.
100
Id. at 37.
101
Id.
102
Requejo Isidro, supra note 10, at 6. The DIFC judges include five English judges, and an Australian,
New Zealand, and Hong Kong judge. Walker, supra note 13, at 6; Judges, DIFC CTS.,
https://www.difccourts.ae/court-structure/judges/ (last visited March 4, 2020).
103
Laws and Regulations Administered by the DIFC Authority, DUBAI INT’L FIN. CTR.,
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https://www.difccourts.ae/court-rules/part-35-miscellaneous-provisions-relating-to-hearings/ (last
visited Apr. 26, 2020).
106
JAYANTH K. KRISHNAN, THE STORY OF THE DUBAI INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CENTRE COURTS: A
RETROSPECTIVE 60 (2018).
107
Id.
108
Krishnan, supra note 106, at 40; Requejo Isidro, supra note 10, at 6–7.

244

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 45: 2

of the court’s jurisdiction, for example, to hear cases involving Islamic banking
and to reject motions to dismiss on the basis of forum non conveniens.109
The DIFC courts also offer appealing characteristics in terms of joinder
and appellate review. On joinder, in DIFC courts, “connected contracts and
parties can be joined, and proceedings can be consolidated.”110 The right to
appeal cannot be waived and “unusually, the lower court’s decision may be
appealed by a person who is not a party … but is directly affected by a judgment
or order.”111
The DIFC courts have also been recognized as being “entrepreneurial in
terms of enforcement,”112 since DIFC court judgments are fully enforceable
within the DIFC. In another case, the Court established that it would fully
recognize and enforce an English judgment as though it were a Dubai judgment.
In the same period, some foreign courts began enforcing DIFC judgments as
well.113 To enforce DIFC judgments outside of the DIFC but within the UAE,
prevailing parties can follow specified procedures.114 Outside the UAE, each
nation follows its own law for recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, such as those from the DIFC courts. The UAE is a party to several
multilateral and bilateral recognition and enforcement treaties, and DIFC courts
themselves have independently established a number of non-binding agreements
with partner institutions around the world, such as the London Commercial
Court, the Federal Court of Australia, the Southern District of New York, the
Supreme Court of Singapore, and the Supreme Court of the Republic of
Kazakhstan.115
DIFC courts also offer parties the ability to bring a court-rendered
money judgment to arbitration at the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre (or any
other arbitration center).116 This unusual process allows a prevailing party to
convert its court money judgment into an arbitral award, which can be easier to
enforce in a broader number of countries under the New York Convention.
The DIFC has established itself as a hospitable legal environment for
investment as well as for dispute resolution. As a marker of success, in 2014, the
tribunal heard its first case in a dispute arising out of a contractual agreement
that assigned DIFC jurisdiction.117 In 2016, the DIFC court decided 217 disputes
109

Krishnan, supra note 106, at 41.
Walker, supra note 13, at 11; Part 20: Addition and Substitution of Parties, DIFC CTS.,
https://www.difccourts.ae/court-rules/part-20-addition-and-substitution-of-parties/ (last visited March 4,
2020).
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Walker, supra note 13, at 15.
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Erie, The New Legal Hubs, supra note 4, at 35.
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Id. (discussing Australian court’s enforcement of DIFC judgment).
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Id. at 35.
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Id. at 36, n.217. Pursuant to such agreements, for example, India updated its civil code in January
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enforceable in India. Amendment to the Indian Civil Code, VINSON & ELKINS (Jan. 23, 2020),
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involving, in the aggregate, more than $500 million.118 The Singapore Academy
of Law reported that, in 2016, the number of contracts drafted in English in the
Middle East and North Africa choosing the DIFC as the seat for disputes
increased to 42% (while London’s share went from 52% in 2015 to 25% in
2016).119 At least one leading law firm has recommended that clients include the
DIFC court in their forum-selection clauses.120 The high settlement rate for DIFC
cases could be seen as a sign that “the court is doing its job” and creating
“certainty and trust.”121 The DIFC courts have found in favor of the government
in cases involving the DIFC Authority, but they have also ruled against quasigovernment corporations.122
DIFC courts are continuing to evolve. In 2017, the DIFC courts and the
Dubai Future Foundation launched an initiative to create “Courts of the Future,”
which is “designed to support companies developing new technologies, sectors
and applications—from blockchain to 3D-printing.”123 In this way, this
investment-minded court appears to be trying to transform itself into a regional
litigation destination.
The DIFC’s modern laws include a modern Arbitration Law.124
According to the DIFC website, “[b]usinesses in Dubai are free to choose
between litigation and arbitration, common and civil law, and English and Arabic
language—whichever system best suits their specific needs. The driving force
has not been competition between courts for cases, but rather competition
between countries for investment.”125
118
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International Firms, THE LAWYER (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.thelawyer.com/issues/the-lawyeroctober-2017/law-firms-in-middle-east-2017/; id. (“And this niche market, according to Al Tamimi
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understanding.’”).
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B. Aspiring Litigation Destinations
The States and localities that this Section calls “aspiring litigation
destinations” have all proclaimed that they hope to become a global leader in
international commercial dispute resolution. They frame international
commercial courts as the end in themselves rather than as a means to attract
foreign direct investment; although, of course, part of the goal is supposed to be
to attract the business of adjudication. To do so, these States have built or
established new courts or judicial divisions focused on adjudicating international
commercial disputes.
Some of these courts, like those in Singapore and Paris, seek to add to
their existing prominence as “arbitration destinations”—that is, desirable arbitral
seats. For others, like Amsterdam and Frankfurt, the localities have relatively
arbitration-friendly domestic law, but are not otherwise go-to arbitration
destinations. The courts described in this Section are designed to accommodate
litigation of substantive disputes, not just to enforce arbitration clauses and
awards. Their stated goal is to be designated in choice-of-forum clauses in
international commercial contracts and to provide a desirable venue for the
litigation of non-contract-based commercial disputes.
Litigation destinations are often modeled on, or inspired by, the London
Commercial Court. They have broad jurisdiction. Many do not require any local
connection between the case and the forum State as a basis for jurisdiction. But
while London and New York distinguished themselves as providers of both
substantive law and a forum for adjudication, these new courts seem less
concerned about developing standard-bearing substantive law. On substantive
law, their selling point is that they robustly enforce choice-of-law clauses so that
parties get the substantive law of their choice.126
These litigation destinations are too new for their success at attracting
regional or global adjudication business to be evaluated with confidence, but
they should have a prominent position on any watch list.
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See, e.g., JIEYING LIANG, PARTY AUTONOMY IN CONTRACTUAL CHOICE OF LAW IN CHINA 50 (2018);
SICC, SICC PROCEDURAL GUIDE (2019), https://www.sicc.gov.sg/docs/default-source/legislation-rulespd/sicc-procedural-guide-(20190724)-(pdf).pdf; Guangjian Tu, The Flowing Tide of Parties’ Freedom
in Private International Law: Party Autonomy in Contractual Choice-of-Law in China, 15 J. PRIV. INT’L
L. 234 (2019); Rachel Chiu Li Hsien, Clothing the Bare: The Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses in
Singapore, NYU LAW (Mar. 2, 2018), https://blogs.law.nyu.edu/transnational/2018/03/clothing-thebare-the-enforcement-of-arbitration-clauses-in-singapore (noting the sparse choice-of-law analysis that
led to the court applying Singapore law; Tiong Min Yeo, Choice of Law for Contracts: The Hague
Principles from a Singaporean and Asian Perspective, 10th Yong Pung How Professorship of Law
Lecture ¶¶ 27, 35–39 (May 22, 2019),
https://cebcla.smu.edu.sg/sites/cebcla.smu.edu.sg/files/Paper2017.pdf (suggesting that the SICC might
recognize parties’ choice of non-state law, but that issue is unlikely to come up in practice).
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1. Singapore
Singapore seems set on becoming the go-to destination for all
international dispute resolution needs, especially in Asia.127 In 1991, Singapore
established the Singapore International Arbitration Centre, which has become
one of the top three or four choices for arbitration internationally, according to a
survey of international arbitration users.128 In 2014, Singapore established a
mediation center to supplement its ADR offerings.129
Then, in 2015, Singapore opened the Singapore International
Commercial Court (SICC) as a division of the Singapore High Court.130 The
SICC’s stated purpose is “to enhance [Singapore’s] status as a leading forum for
legal services and commercial dispute resolution”131 and to become “an Asian
dispute resolution hub catering to international disputes with an Asian
connection.”132 Its target audience, at least for now, is regional rather than global.
While it had already established state-of-the-art arbitration and
mediation centers and developed law highly deferential to arbitration
agreements,133 Singapore saw the SICC as an important complement to its
dispute resolution offerings. To this end, the SICC is partially staffed by
international judges,134 and it permits the admission of foreign lawyers,
confidential proceedings, and limitations on appellate review.135 It is also
receptive to parties’ customization of evidence and procedural rules.136
A key feature that sets the SICC apart is its adaptability: its highly
customizable procedures are intended to cater to the parties’ needs and reflect
foreign legal traditions.137 Parties may opt out of the Singapore Rules of
Evidence, for example.138 In terms of the overall legal structure of the court, both
the court and the legislature have been receptive to criticism. For example, the
127
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SICC originally had a pre-action certification process designed to give parties an
early indication on key issues, such as jurisdiction.139 After parties complained
about that process, the legislature removed it in 2017.140
The SICC does not hide its intention to compete with arbitration, to
borrow some of its preferable characteristics and to address some of its
shortcomings.141 For example, the SICC’s international focus is in part intended
to create a “freestanding body of international commercial law” and address the
weaknesses of arbitration in creating law.142 The SICC rules also grant wide
discretion to allow joinder of non-parties to the SICC agreement.143 This
permissive joinder rule was adopted to counter the difficulty in arbitration of
joining parties that were not signatories to the arbitration agreement.144 For
appeals, the SICC offers an opportunity to appeal to the Singapore High Court
of Appeal but also allows parties to agree to limit or exclude that right.145
Singapore has received recognition for its excellence in dispute
resolution services. As a country, it boasts the shortest dispute resolution time
worldwide and is ranked first on the ease of enforcing contracts.146 Since the
SICC was created in 2015, it has rendered 62 judgments.147 Most of its cases
have been referred by the Singapore High Court.148 The cases have been high
stakes: the first decision involved a S$1.1 billion dispute (about US $800

139
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Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Bill, No. 47/2017, § 3, https://sso.agc.gov.sg/BillsSupp/47-2017/Published/20171106?DocDate=20171106 (Sing.); Leng Sun Chan & Adam Gian,
Singapore International Commercial Court to Have Jurisdiction Over Litigation Related to
International Commercial Arbitration, GLOB. ARBITRATION NEWS (Feb. 12, 2018),
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million).149 The decisions in these cases have been delivered expeditiously—
within three months of the hearing.150 Some were decided in less than a month.151
Singapore appears poised and ready to compete for adjudication business at an
extremely high level. Its arbitration center and dispute resolution services are
already making a name for themselves, and the new SICC may soon join their
ranks. In 2018, “[t]he legal industry contributed $2.3 billion to Singapore’s GDP
. . . , up from $1.5 billion in 2009.”152
On the other hand, “the neutrality of Singapore’s courts has been
questioned, particularly in politically sensitive cases.”153 Tests of the SICC’s
neutrality may come in the future as its cases become more complex and possibly
involve government entities.
2. Courts on the Continent: Could They Be Contenders?
Several cities in Europe have either recently opened or are considering
opening a new court, chamber, or division of their courts devoted exclusively to
international commercial disputes. Commentators see these efforts
straightforwardly as an attempt “to challenge the hegemony of English courts in
international commercial litigation,”154 especially given the uncertainty
regarding the U.K.’s stature in Europe and worldwide in the aftermath of the
Brexit vote.155 At the beginning, some feared U.K. judgments would no longer
be easily enforceable throughout the EU,156 and many cited that fear as a reason
why other European States opened their own international commercial courts.157
Many, but not all, of the complicated questions about the enforceability of U.K.
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judgments post-Brexit have now been resolved.158 Brexit does not directly affect
London’s prominence as an arbitration center159 because recognition of arbitral
awards had already been governed by a preexisting and unaffected international
regime, the New York Convention. But the uncertainty surrounding what will
happen with respect to London’s status as an international financial and legal
center over the long term may compromise London’s attractiveness and the ease
of enforcing judgments or arbitral awards within the U.K. itself if defendants’
assets leave the U.K.160 Brexit also has come to represent the contradiction of
some of English law’s most appealing attributes: its predictability and stability.
This Section will discuss the new international commercial courts
established and proposed in Amsterdam, Paris, Frankfurt, and Brussels. These
are the most prominent, but not the only examples of efforts to form international
commercial courts within Europe. Other German cities have also opened similar
international commercial chambers. Reports indicate that Zurich and Geneva are
considering creating a specialized international commercial chamber of the
existing court that would operate in English.161 Dublin has a commercial division
that follows the “old school” model: It is not specifically dedicated to
international disputes, but it could be well-positioned to compete with the U.K.
for cross-border dispute resolution in a post-Brexit era given that it is the only
English-speaking and common law country in the EU.162 There may be more in
the future.
Amsterdam. The Netherlands has long been a hub of international
commerce and is increasingly a litigation destination for certain kinds of
transnational disputes, including global class actions.163 Dutch courts already
permitted parties to submit exhibits in English and sometimes permit hearings to
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be conducted in English.164 Court judgments are rendered in Dutch but are
accompanied by an English summary.165
One unusual feature of Dutch procedure is the conservatory arrest, also
known as Dutch freezing or Mareva injunction. These orders prevent assets
located in the Netherlands from being removed or otherwise disposed of during
the proceedings. Dutch courts award these orders quite readily, which may attract
potential plaintiffs.166
On January 1, 2019, the Dutch launched the Netherlands Commercial
Court, which includes a trial level and a dedicated appellate level court.167
Despite the generalist name, the NCC’s jurisdiction is limited to
international disputes.168 It does not require the parties to have any ties to the
Netherlands if they consent to the NCC’s jurisdiction.169 The courts use Dutch
procedure, but all proceedings and judgments are in English.170 Evidence may
be submitted in Dutch, German, French, or English without requiring
translation.171 Thus, the NCC’s claim to fame is that it is “an English-language
environment within a civil law jurisdiction.”172 Its website has a sleek video
advertising that the court offers “the best of both worlds.”173 The website also
boasts that Dutch courts are ranked number one worldwide by the World Justice
Project and that “NCC judges are impartial, independent and experienced in
complex international business matters.”174
164
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The trial and appellate level courts are part of the ordinary Dutch
judiciary as chambers of the Amsterdam trial and appellate courts. The judges
are selected from the Dutch judiciary for their experience in commercial disputes
and their language skills. A panel of three judges and one law clerk typically
hears disputes.175 The appellate division hears appeals in English, but subsequent
appeals to the highest court of the Netherlands take place in Dutch. Parties must
be represented by lawyers who are members of the Dutch bar, for only they can
carry out “acts of process,”176 and parties may not proceed pro se.177
The NCC Rules focus on flexibility. The Rules provide that “[a]t a
party’s request or of its own initiative, the court gives all such directions as may
facilitate the just, fair and speedy disposition of the action.”178 With some
exceptions, the parties may agree to depart from the standard rules of
evidence.179 Confidentiality orders are permitted “[f]or compelling reasons,”180
but the judgments are ordinarily public.181 The unsuccessful party bears the costs
of lawyers’ fees and court fees,182 which are substantially higher than the fees in
ordinary Dutch courts.183 The NCC rules also contemplate broad authority to add
third parties or consolidate cases at either the parties’ or the court’s initiative.184
Dutch law is also arbitration-friendly. In 2015, the Dutch arbitration law
was updated to improve the efficiency of arbitration procedures and limit the
possibility of national courts setting aside arbitral awards.185 The NCC website
has an interesting “Factsheet” devoted to the “NCC and Arbitration.”186 It notes
some reasons why parties might prefer to resolve their disputes at the NCC rather
than in arbitration.187 It also boasts the NCC as a good forum both for enforcing
arbitral awards and for setting them aside.188 The NCC’s promoters seem wary
of the complicated relationship between the NCC and arbitration.
Paris. Paris prides itself on being one of the most arbitration-friendly
jurisdictions in the world.189 It is home to the International Chamber of
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Commerce (ICC), established in 1923,190 which hosts the International Court of
Arbitration, a leading global arbitral institution.191
The development of an international commercial court in 2010 and of a
new international chamber of the Court of Appeal in 2018 built upon this
arbitration expertise.192 The 2010 chamber, a new division of the Paris courts,
was created “to cater to international litigation and hear disputes between French
and foreign companies or between foreign companies.”193 The chamber was
marketed as enhancing Paris’s “attractiveness as a financial center,” and helping
to turn Paris into “an indispensable legal marketplace.”194 A 2010 invention, it
was obviously not a reaction to Brexit, but it also did not attract many cases.195
In February 2018, a special international commercial chamber of the
Paris Court of Appeal was created to supplement the trial level chamber.196 The
jurisdiction of both the trial level and appellate chambers is limited to
“transnational commercial disputes” relating to international commercial
contracts, transportation, unfair competition, anti-competitive commercial
practices, and various kinds of financial transactions.197
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Jason Fry & Simon Greenberg, Review of the International Court of Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION PRACTICE: 21ST CENTURY
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http://www.eurolegal.net/useruploads/files/doc/Majorca2017/Presentation%20of%20Olivier%20Mandel
%20for%20the%20Eurolegal%20Conference%20(April%2014%202018).pptx.
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Relevant Through the Centuries, HEC PARIS (June 14, 2017),
https://www.hec.edu/en/knowledge/articles/how-frances-commercial-courts-stay-relevant-throughcenturies (“[J]udges [in the sixteenth century] were not officials trained in law, but tradesmen elected by
other tradesmen to settle commercial disputes. Today, at the Tribunaux de commerce (1st degree
commercial court), the elected positions remain voluntary and unpaid.”).
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supra note 6.
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https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/paris-international-jurisdiction-creation-chambersspecialized-cross-border.
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Protocol on Procedural Rules Applicable to the International Chamber of the Paris Commercial
Court, art. 1, AVOCAT PARIS (Feb. 21, 2018),
http://www.avocatparis.org/system/files/editos/protocole_barreau_de_paris__tribunal_de_commerce_de_paris_version_anglaise.pdf (hereinafter CITC Protocol); Protocol on
Procedural Rules Applicable to the International Chamber of the Court of Appeals of Paris, art. 1,
AVOCAT PARIS (Jan. 26, 2018),
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This division opened in March 2018, staffed by French judges who
spoke English and had “English common-law capabilities.”198 Parties, experts,
third-party witnesses, and legal counsel (who are not French nationals) may
speak in English at hearings.199 However, when a party uses English in
appearances before the courts under this provision, the party must arrange
simultaneous translation and bear the costs.200 Documentary evidence may be
submitted in English.201 Pleadings and filings must be drafted in French.202
Judgments will be delivered in French and accompanied by an official English
translation.203 Non-French lawyers are also allowed to appear before the
International Chamber if accompanied by a member of the Paris Bar. Both the
expanded use of English and the admission of foreign lawyers are considered
radical departures from the traditionally deeply French institution’s previous
procedures, although the practical changes are limited.204
Overall, the Protocols are touted as providing “highly innovative rules
of procedure,” where the “parties appearing before those Chambers are given
unprecedented flexibility.”205 The disputes will remain public, however, and
parties may not opt into using the special division. For a case to proceed in the
international chambers, the parties must select the Paris Commercial Court as
their forum of choice and then the court may refer the case to the special
international commercial division.206 As of December 2018, “seventeen cases
had been filed before the [new appellate chamber], and hearings of two of them
had taken place.”207 The International Commercial Chamber of the Paris Court
of Appeal issued its first decision in February 2020.208
Frankfurt. German scholars have been advocating for Englishlanguage proceedings in German courts for almost a decade. Aachen, Bonn, and
Cologne have had English-language courts since 2010, although they have not
had many cases.209 Early German proposals were not focused on creating an
international commercial division that would compete with London, but rather
on competing with arbitration, which offered, among other advantages, the
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availability of proceedings in English.210 In these efforts, Germans saw U.S. state
business courts, especially New York’s, as a model.211
In January 2018, the Frankfurt High Court opened a specialized
chamber for international commercial matters.212 The Chamber has jurisdiction
over international commercial disputes if the parties have agreed to its
jurisdiction.213 The Chamber has three German judges: one experienced
professional judge and two business experts who are not professional judges.
The business experts are “appointed for a term of five years upon the
recommendation of the local Chamber for Industry and Commerce.”214
In terms of procedures, the Chamber abides by the German Code of
Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung). The oral proceedings operate in English,
but written documents and judgments must be in German.215 The Chamber’s
website declares that proceedings are “usually held in public.”216 The Chamber
does not require additional fees and generally imposes costs on the nonprevailing party.217 The Chamber “encourages settlement at every stage of the
proceedings,” and begins with a conciliation hearing. Similar chambers exist in
Hamburg, Dusseldorf, and Munich.218
There are a number of current proposals about how Frankfurt could
strengthen its position as a potential legal hub for cross-border disputes in
Europe.219 Many commenters, however, question whether, and when, German
international commercial chambers will attract cases.220 German law is already
arbitration-friendly and German authorities advertise Germany as a top arbitral
forum, growing in popularity.221
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Thus far, however, the chambers have had limited success. Frankfurt
has had at least one case since opening in January 1, 2018.222 It has been quite
successful in recruiting some of the financial industry displaced by Brexit,223 but
the market share of the adjudication business has not come along with that
industry—at least not yet.224
Brussels. In October 2017, the Belgian Council of Ministers approved
a draft bill to establish an international English-speaking commercial court in
Brussels, the “Brussels International Business Court” (BIBC), expected to open
by January 1, 2020.225 In March 2019, however, political opposition blocked
future development of this initiative.226
The proposal, nevertheless, was a fascinating example of a potential
international commercial court. The BIBC promised court proceedings that
closely mimic arbitration. Instead of Belgian procedures, the rules of the Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration of the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) would apply, with some alterations.
Jurisdiction of the court would encompass international commercial disputes,
and parties do not need to have a connection with Belgium.227
Reports indicated that the court’s focus would be on flexibility, and the
borrowing from arbitration is not subtle. In addition to the adoption of the
UNCITRAL rules, the BIBC’s judges would include professional judges as well
as international business law specialists, and they did not need to be Belgian.
Final judgments would not be subject to appeal. In another echo of arbitration,
funding for the BIBC would come from the parties, rather than the State
judiciary’s budget.228
The proposed BIBC strongly resembled a State-sponsored arbitral
tribunal. These distinctive features, however, may have prevented the BIBC from
seeing the light of day. MPs objected that the BIBC offered “two-tiered justice”
and the establishment of a “caviar court” for the “super rich.”229 The judiciary
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itself fiercely opposed the BIBC on these same grounds and also questioned the
feasibility and costs of the court and whether it would be able to attract cases.230
C. China: Quest for Control?
In December 2018, China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) established
two new Chinese international commercial tribunals, collectively known as the
Chinese International Commercial Court (CICC), one in Shenzhen and another
in Xi’an.231 The CICC is intended to “streamline and control” the flow of
disputes arising out of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).232 The purpose of
the CICC, according to its website, is “to try international commercial cases
fairly and timely in accordance with the law, protect the lawful rights and
interests of the Chinese and foreign parties equally, and create a stable, fair,
transparent, and convenient rule of law international business environment.”233
One set of scholars explained China’s development of international commercial
courts as an effort “to share the expanding international business dispute
resolution market, better protect its investments and have a greater say in the
harmoni[z]ation of substantive international business law.”234 A functioning and
legitimate dispute resolution system seems essential to the success of the BRI, to
which President Xi is strongly committed.235 The CICC’s jurisdiction, however,
is not limited to BRI disputes.236
These courts “mark[] the first time [China] is creating legal institutions
for the world.”237 This development contrasts with a fascinating history,
however, of the world creating legal institutions for itself within China.238 The
230
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CICC claims to be a “‘one stop shop’ for international commercial dispute
resolution services, including mediation, arbitration, and litigation that are
‘organically integrated.’”239
The CICC’s jurisdiction is limited to international commercial disputes,
defined as involving one or more foreign parties or relevant foreign “objects” or
“legal facts.”240 It will not hear investor-State disputes.241 Notably, the CICC
does not have an entirely consent-based system of jurisdiction. There are two
main categories: cases where the parties decide they should be brought before
the CICC (if the amount in controversy is over RMB 300 million, or
approximately $44 million), and cases where the SPC decides.242 When
jurisdiction is based on consent, “only cases with actual connection with China
can be submitted to the CICC.”243 In December 2018, the CICC accepted its first
set of cases, none of which specifically related to the Belt and Road Initiative.244
The first hearing, in May 2019, involved a four-hour-long hearing in a case
unrelated to the BRI, brought by Thailand’s Ruoychai International Group
against Red Bull Vitamin Drink, Co. and third party Inter-Biopharm Holding
Ltd., disputing the qualifications of Red Bull shareholders.245
In some ways, the CICC is designed with an eye toward establishing
international expertise and reliability.246 The CICC has an English-language
website and provides a platform for e-filing and other kinds of electronic
communications between the parties and with the courts.247 The judges are
Chinese professional judges with expertise in international commercial disputes,
conflicts of law, and have English-language proficiency. Three or more judges
sit on a panel for any given case. Although it does not employ international jurists
239
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240
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like the courts in Qatar or Singapore, the CICC has an International Commercial
Expert Committee, comprised of Chinese and non-Chinese legal professionals,
who may preside over mediation, provide advisory opinions on issues relating to
international and foreign commercial law, and offer advice on judicial
interpretations and policies.248
Unlike the DIFC or the SICC, which were products of constitutional
amendments and have certain exemptions from local law, the CICC is a creation
of the Supreme People’s Court.249 The CICC, therefore, operates under Chinese
law, which follows a modified civil/political law system.250 As The Economist
recently described the system, “In the law courts of Communist China, power
and political control count for more than fairness.”251 Accordingly, the CICC
judges will likely have less discretion and flexibility than judges in other
jurisdictions, and parties will have less control over proceedings than parties
would have in the SICC, for example.252
Much is still unclear about how the CICC will function, but the CICC
Procedure Rules offer some information. The proceedings will be in Chinese,
but evidence may be submitted in English and need not be translated if the
opposing party consents to the English submission.253 The CICC offers
translation services at the parties’ expense.254 The rules provide that the CICC
will apply foreign law if chosen by the parties to govern their dispute.255 To
establish jurisdiction, the plaintiff will have to file a written agreement to submit
to the court’s jurisdiction.256 The CICC encourages pre-trial mediation.257
To improve the enforceability of CICC judgments (among other
reasons), China, along with Singapore and the EU, was involved in negotiations
over the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign

248

Finder, supra note 244; Huang Jin, An Educated Gentleman Cannot But Be Resolute And BroadMinded, For He Has Taken Up A Heavy Responsibility And A Long Course, Speech at the Opening
Ceremony and the First Seminar of the International Commercial Expert Committee of the Supreme
People’s Court of China, (Aug. 26, 2018), http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/199/203/1058.html. See
also Judges, CICC, cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/193/196/index.html.
249
Erie, ASIL, supra note 231. The CICC shares this trait in common with its Dutch, French, and
German counterparts. Most U.S. state business courts have also been created as a division of existing
local courts. See Coyle, Business Courts, supra note 31.
250
For a description of the Chinese legal system and the difficulties that Western scholars face in trying
to understand it, see Don Clarke, Puzzling Observations in Chinese Law: When is a Riddle Just a
Mistake?, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 93–121 (Stephen Hsu ed., 2003).
251
A Belt-and-Road Court, supra note 246.
252
See Erie, The New Legal Hubs, supra note 4.
253
Procedural Rules for the China International Commercial Court of the Supreme People’s Court, art.
9, CHINA INT’L COMM. CT. (updated Dec. 5, 2018),
http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/208/210/1183.html [hereinafter CICC Rules]; Sun, supra note 240
(clarifying that proceedings before the court cannot be in English).
254
CICC Rules, art. 6.
255
Id., art. 7.
256
Id., art. 8.
257
Id., art. 17.

260

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 45: 2

Judgments.258 China has signed but not yet ratified the convention.259
Additionally, China is considering ratifying the Hague Convention on the Choice
of Court Agreements (COCA).260 Without signing these treaties, enforcement
uncertainty may hinder the development of the CICC: parties will not be able to
reliably predict whether a foreign jurisdiction will recognize a CICC
judgment.261 Moreover, even with these agreements, enforceability may still be
less certain than with arbitration awards.
Some experts view the CICC with excitement.262 Matthew Erie notes
that “[t]he CICC is potentially most innovative in providing multiple
mechanisms for dispute resolution.”263 But he also recognizes the challenges
facing the CICC: “uneven enforcement, Chinese language, and authoritarian
government.”264 Susan Finder, a member of the CICC’s International
Commercial Expert Committee, writes, “As a court focused on international
commercial issues staffed by some of China’s most knowledgeable judges in that
area, the court is likely to have a positive effect on the competence of the Chinese
judiciary regarding international trade and investment issues, particularly as the
SPC leadership knows that the international legal community is monitoring the
court’s operation.”265 The CICC has a lot of potential upside for China.
According to one of the CICC’s advisors, Shan Wenhua, the CICC responds to
the “‘great risks’” that Chinese businesses face “in belt-and-road countries where
legal systems are not of ‘very high’ quality.”266 He also described the CICC as a
way of “‘creating a better system,’” explaining that “having to rely on foreign
legal systems is ‘out of keeping with [their] status as a major power.’”267
The Economist’s take is more sanguine. Its Chinese bureau opined: “The
tribunals could one day matter a lot, should they be used to export a vision of
international law that reflects [their] worldview [that independent courts are a
fallacy]. At the moment, an obsession with power and order is hobbling the new
258
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tribunals. But that could change: China’s autocrats may not be as clumsy
forever.”268
While the CICC seems marketed toward being an internationally
respected institution, it is unclear whether the court will establish itself as
independent or consistent with international standards.269 To date, for example,
all of the arbitration and mediation associations that have been selected to work
with the CICC have been Chinese institutions, which has raised concerns that the
system will be biased in favor of Chinese parties.270 There is also some fear that
these ADR offerings will become mandatory or that parties will feel forced into
them, which is contrary to the consent-based foundations of arbitration and
mediation.271 In the Supreme Court’s annual report to the legislature in March,
President Zhou Qiang pledged “to uphold the Communist Party’s ‘absolute
leadership’ over the work of Chinese courts, . . . [and] called for strict
implementation of rules requiring judges to seek Communist leaders’
instructions when ‘major matters’ arise.”272
III.

WHAT DRIVES THE CREATION OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
COURTS?

Most of the literature analyzing international commercial courts
assumes that these institutions have recently emerged as States’ efforts to
compete with international arbitration or with the London Commercial Court.273
According to this narrative, the rise of international commercial courts is a
positive story of competition driving States to create better mousetraps for
dispute resolution. In other words, this competition is predicted to yield a “race
to the top” with jurisdictions striving to improve upon litigation and arbitration
in international commercial disputes.
Part II of this Article, however, complicates this received account. It
reveals that the proliferation of international commercial courts reflects a
multiplicity of driving factors. States may be trying to encourage local and
regional investment, establish themselves as litigation destinations, cement
geopolitical power, or pursue some combination of these and other goals. This
perspective complicates the standard account of the adjudication business in a
number of ways. At its most basic, the account in Part II reveals both a diversity
of courts and a diversity of factors driving their creation.
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This Part analyzes, critiques, and supplements the standard account that
the rise of international commercial courts reflects a global competition to create
the best dispute resolution in courts. After laying out the standard account, this
Part discusses the factors that may drive these courts to develop sub-optimal law
and procedures. It then proposes additional lenses through which to view the rise
of international commercial courts, arguing that the competition framework
cannot fully explain this phenomenon. While the competition model has intuitive
appeal and explanatory force, the rise of these courts should be examined through
historical, sociological, domestic political-economic, and geopolitical lenses,
which suggest that the pure competition story is incomplete. Understanding the
many factors driving the rise of international commercial courts is important to
begin to study their potential global impact.
A. The Standard Account
The standard account of global competition fits into an extensive body
of scholarship that conceives of law—including the provision of dispute
resolution services—as a market.274 For example, scholars argue that States
support the establishment of arbitration centers “not just because they are
perceived to create a favorable aura for international investment, but because
arbitration generates revenue” 275—by bringing in people who pay for real estate,
local legal services, hotels, food, and so on.276 International commercial
arbitration has become a business in itself.277 Scholars debate, however, whether
and how much national courts participate in this market and compete with
private arbitration.278 International commercial courts prove that at least some
courts do compete on these levels.
Thus, parties “shopping” for a forum to select in their contracts can
choose where and how to resolve their disputes, and courts and arbitral tribunals
try to “sell” themselves in this market. Scholarship typically considers forum
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shopping in contracts to be efficient279 and forum shopping by plaintiffs in noncontractual disputes to be, to put it mildly, inefficient.280 In the former context,
there is thought to be desirable and beneficial interjurisdictional competition.281
The latter context, scholars argue, leads to “forum shopping” by plaintiffs,
“forum selling” by courts,282 and an overall “race to the bottom.”283
This narrative is often repeated in accounts of the rise of international
commercial courts. Scholars say that the London Commercial Court, for
example, became a prime forum choice in international contracts not by adapting
to an international standard, but by setting the standards for transnational
commercial litigation itself.284 The rise of international commercial courts
around the world, likewise, is attributed to new courts wanting to compete with
London or with arbitration to provide better dispute resolution and thus become
the new market leader.285 Scholars tout the positive effects of this competition:
international commercial courts will “learn[] the best from other countries,
improve[] their own procedures,” and, hopefully, eventually “transfer[] best
practices to domestic civil litigation.”286
This account has intuitive appeal. All else being equal, sophisticated
international parties with equal bargaining power may prefer a combination of
reduced legal risk and an expeditious process.287 More choices in this area could
push all providers to improve on both of these accounts. Courts that fail to do so
will not be chosen by parties; and to the extent that their jurisdiction is entirely
consent-based, the court then may, in effect, go out of business.
The competition model is in some ways a satisfying description of the
courts discussed in Part II. The old-school legal hubs, London and New York,
279
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are still innovating and trying to attract more adjudication business.288 In
describing their own institutions, supporters of the Singapore and European
courts express the courts’ desire to compete for adjudication business by
providing excellent English-language court options.289 Even Dubai and Qatar
assert that their missions are to offer the best dispute resolution mechanisms in
the world. These States’ advertising campaigns develop this message.290
Moreover, in order to attract cases, these courts probably have to
establish some kind of international legitimacy, which likely depends on quality
dispute resolution.291 These “market” forces may drive these courts to establish
basic levels of fairness and impartiality, which are widely considered markers of
legitimacy.292 The market also requires some amount of transparency to regulate
itself—that is, international commercial courts must be at least somewhat public
about process and judges’ decisions in order to build a trustworthy reputation in
the market. These market incentives may drive a “race to the top.”
B. Cracks in the Standard Account
While the competition account has intuitive appeal, it tends to glide over
the more complicated back stories behind international commercial courts that
Part II illuminated. As a definitional matter, if there is competition, it is likely
regional more than global—as the Asian, European, and Middle Eastern
examples suggest293—and it exists between and among all forms of dispute
resolution, not just between courts and arbitral tribunals, as demonstrated by the
role of mediation in China and Singapore.
But there are four additional reasons why the efficient competition story
falters on closer inspection. First, Part II helps reveal that international
commercial courts, if they are competing, are not necessarily all competing
towards the same end. Second, the competition among international commercial
courts can lead to “forum selling”294 and benefit repeat players to the detriment
of others. In similar contexts, scholars have documented that specialization can
lead to capture. Third, it is difficult to define what the “top” would be if there
were a “race to the top” in the adjudication market. Fourth, the practical realities
of the “demand” side—both how parties choose the forum selected in their
contracts and how international commercial courts define their jurisdiction—
288
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undermine the efficient competition account. In short, just as the corporate law
debate about whether competition produced a race to the top turned out to be
more complicated than it appeared,295 there is a more complicated situation with
these courts as well.
First, as Part II revealed, there is also no global uniformity on what
international commercial courts are for. Litigation destinations seem to be
competing for the business of adjudication—i.e., for cases—but even they differ
on whether they seem to be seeking cases in their courts, or cases more generally
in their cities—whether they be in courts, arbitration, or other forms of ADR.
These differences matter for the future support of arbitration law. Singapore
seems to see arbitration, litigation, and other offerings as potentially growing the
overall dispute resolution “pie”; but other nations, like Germany and the
Netherlands, seem focused on courts without a parallel emphasis on attracting
arbitration. Why do these courts want more cases? Those courts that do not allow
foreign lawyers to appear unless accompanied by local counsel may be catering
to the preferences of the local bar. The SICC, by contrast, allows foreign counsel
to practice and even provides an ethics code for such lawyers.
Investment-minded courts and China, on the other hand, seem focused
on different goals. Despite their assertions about aspiring to provide courts for
the world, investment-minded courts seem primarily to address a need for stable
legal structures to protect local and regional investments. As Amna Sultan Al
Owais, Chief Executive and Registrar of DIFC Courts, explained in a 2018
speech, “The driving force has not been competition between courts for cases,
but rather competition between countries for investment.”296 She put the issue in
blunt economic terms: “[T]hose [countries] ranked highest by the World Bank,
as well as an increasing number of emerging economies, have recognized that
investing in efficient, well-respected business courts . . . is not a nice-to-have,
but rather a need-to-have if they want to compete globally for investment.”297
The “race to the top” analogy could be compatible with investment
seeking.298 Building good courts will also attract investment, at least in theory.
But the incentives are not necessarily aligned. States seeking to attract
investment by establishing courts are not necessarily motivated to create
295
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something new, different and “better,” but rather to replicate mechanisms that
give assurances of stability and predictability—to the extent the market requires,
and possibly no more.299 The adoption of the common law responds to such
incentives.300 These courts try to offer and support fairly conventional courts as
well as arbitration to give investors the dispute resolution options that they have
come to expect elsewhere. As Singapore has shown, a nation can “develop an
effective and efficient legal system that wins high praise from global business”
even if it disregards other aspects of liberal democracy, like separation of powers
and freedom of the press.301 Such a model could lead to courts with more
government influence than might be desirable. For example, the DIFC court does
not have a track record of ruling against the DIFC Authority.302
If providing “high quality” or “efficient” adjudication is just one among
several motivating forces behind these courts, then quality may not be the only
metric that States use to assess the courts’ success and whether they were worth
the effort. For an investment-minded court, the metric of success is likely
financial: Does the court facilitate and encourage investment in the locality and
the region? For an aspiring litigation destination, success will be measured by
whether the court attracts litigation. To determine success, one could watch, for
example, caseload statistics or the frequency with which the forum is designated
in forum-selection clauses. For a court designated to cement geopolitical power,
there is yet another metric for success.
These sets of success metrics do not measure the quality of the courts.
They do not consider the fairness of procedures, outcomes or jurists, the courts’
transparency or efforts to prevent corruption, the speed of case resolution, costeffectiveness, the quality of the procedural or substantive law generated, or the
court’s ability to adapt.303 Having these qualities might contribute to courts’
success at attracting either investment or litigation business. But they might
instead reflect a courts’ expanding jurisdiction or ability to cater to certain
constituencies—whether private parties or the State—at the expense of others.
It is also possible, of course, that many of these courts will fail on these
metrics. To date, the DIFC court and the SICC already consider themselves a
success based on caseload and designation in forum-selection clauses.304 But
their caseloads are paltry in comparison to the London Commercial Court’s, if
that is an appropriate baseline.305 The European courts and the CICC are still at
299
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their very beginning stages—their “success,” however defined, remains to be
seen.306 The point is that these courts have different—and multiple—driving
forces, which may or may not motivate them to improve upon dispute resolution
from an objective viewpoint.
Second, and relatedly, international commercial courts seek to serve a
certain market of repeat players. This market dynamic could make them more
solicitous of those parties’ needs than of other values, should the two conflict.
Scholars of specialized courts warn that specialization does not necessarily make
courts more efficient.307 It can make courts more prone to compete with each
other (and with arbitration),308 and thus more prone to judicial capture.309 In other
words, specialized judges and arbitrators may be more likely to cater to particular
constituencies that regularly appear before them. Some worry that international
arbitrators are particularly susceptible to such capture because arbitrators are
supposed to be both “[a]gents of contracting parties, and . . . [a]gents of a larger
global community.”310 That is, critics argue that arbitrators are, in some senses,
working for the parties who selected them. Judges on international commercial
courts may develop similar roles or reputations.
Scholars of specialized courts recommend that lawmakers creating such
courts “should consider restricting venue options . . . to reduce court
competition”311 and thus thwart capture. Notably, the emerging international
commercial courts appear to take the opposite approach. They open themselves
up to litigants from all over the world, without imposing venue-like limitations
that require cases to have links to the forum State.312
The threat of catering to those contracting parties who choose
international commercial courts may seem benign, especially if one assumes that
the parties have freely consented to the court’s jurisdiction. But the law made for
these parties—in these domestic courts—will be generally applicable law. Those
legal decisions could be more likely to disregard the interests of non-represented
but interested parties, like shareholders, labor, or consumers. Likewise,
prioritizing efficient procedures for international commercial courts but not for
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other parts of the judiciary could lead to further disparities in quality of judicial
offerings. Reflecting this fear, some of the political opposition to the
establishment of these courts in democracies has focused on the fear of creating
“caviar courts”—exceptional procedures for the 1%.313
Another way in which international commercial courts could disregard
third party interests is by aggressively expanding jurisdiction or flexing their
power over non-consenting third parties. International commercial courts may
be tempted to assert such jurisdiction in order to distinguish themselves from
arbitration, which lacks jurisdiction over third parties. The SICC, for example,
has a broad mandate to join non-consenting third parties.314
Third, it is difficult to define the “top” in this market. In the corporate
law context, maximization of firm value can allow academics to judge success
of a corporate law by objective metrics. But even with that metric, the debate
about the normative direction of corporate law is complicated.315 Here, defining
the success of courts, especially compared to each other, is particularly difficult.
Using popularity, docket size, or the stakes of the disputes can be a poor measure
of comparison, even if those may be the metrics on which the courts internally
judge their own success. Trying to compare dispute resolution time or efficiency
or fairness is likewise problematic because it is difficult to compare each of these
issues and weigh them vis-à-vis each other. It is also difficult to identify the
proper baseline for comparison.316 In addition, different parties and different
kinds of disputes may lend themselves to different kinds of adjudication.
Attempts to define quality adjudication can also be elusive.
In spite of these difficulties, this Article’s Part II case studies reveal a
market for a respected, independent set of decisionmakers to resolve disputes.
London’s Commercial Court has long been considered the gold standard on this
front, but some of those very same judges are now sitting on the DIFC court, the
SICC, and the QIC.
More broadly, those jurisdictions seem to rely heavily on the
international composition of their judiciaries as proof that the courts will be
independent, fair, and legitimate. Perhaps no one knows exactly how to define
excellence in dispute resolution, but there are certain judges whose reputations
bring with them assurances of reliability, fairness, and independence. The
international commercial courts in Europe, however, with the exception of the
Belgian experiment, all employ national judges who are subject matter experts
and English speakers, but who might be tempted (at least as much as any national
313
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judge) to favor locals, a common criticism of national judges. Those European
international commercial courts in this respect hew more closely to traditional
court models and perhaps, relying on their democratic legitimacy, do not see the
need for—or cannot spend the political capital on—employing foreign judges.
The CICC has forged a middle path by employing well-regarded
Chinese judges supplemented with a panel of international experts. Observers
nevertheless continue to harbor considerable skepticism about the neutrality and
independence of the CICC, and so it remains to be seen if and how this panel
will affect the perceived legitimacy of this fledgling court.
Finally, any competition among international commercial courts and
arbitration is unlikely to be a fair and efficient competition because of how
parties typically include forum selection clauses in their contracts. The standard
competition theory assumes that sophisticated parties with equal bargaining
power compromise on forum choice based on the quality (efficiency, neutrality,
etc.) of the forum. But studies suggest that these conditions do not hold.317
As a matter of contract bargaining, one also should not automatically
assume equality of bargaining power from the international commercial context.
Superior bargaining power—rather than compromise—may be more likely to
drive choice-of-forum designations in contracts.318 That construct further
undermines the idea that forum selection in contracts is much different from
forum shopping in other contexts.319 Put another way, international commercial
courts seem to be engaging in “forum selling” in ways that seem not that different
from the efforts to attract patent and other specialized kinds of litigation that
scholars have documented in U.S.320 and German courts321 because strong parties
are engaging in “forum shopping.” This explanation has particular force when
applied to the Chinese “Belt and Road” courts, where it seems possible that
China or Chinese state-owned entities might insist on CICC forum selection
clauses in BRI contracts. The same might be true for government or governmentinfluenced contracts in other countries.
Even if one assumes arm’s length negotiations, however, studies on
how parties—whether individually or together—select the forum for their
contract disputes also suggest that parties are not necessarily looking for the
best dispute resolution mechanism. Instead, parties’ first priorities both in
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum decisions are, first, having a home-court
317
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advantage and a familiar forum and, second, the sophistication of the legal
system.322 These priorities reinforce the possibility that the growth of
international commercial courts may be an effort to cater to the preferences of
the local bar and other local business interests.
This leads to a fundamental question that is often raised by observers
of international commercial courts: Is there an actual demand for these courts?
It is not entirely clear, for example, whether companies are dissatisfied with
current litigation and arbitration offerings, or, more to the point, whether they
would prefer a local specialized court alternative. It is likewise unclear that
these courts are aimed at serving the needs of international businesses, local
lawyers, or other constituencies.323 Observers often doubt whether any of these
new national courts will “manage to convince internationally active companies
to settle their disputes on the European continent rather than in London.”324
The proliferation of international commercial courts in light of this skepticism
suggests either bold-faced optimism in spite of it, or that attracting cases is not
the only reason for establishing these courts. International commercial courts
may instead be trying to balkanize the market or appease local interests.
C. Other Lenses
The previous Section challenged the competition framework for
understanding the rise of international commercial courts on its own terms,
questioning whether international commercial courts are all aiming for the same
goals, whether they in fact are more concerned with catering to certain
constituencies than crafting the best dispute resolution mechanism, whether it is
possible to define a “best” mechanism for resolving disputes, and whether the
competition analogy works in terms of the practical realities of drafting forum
selection clauses. That Section revealed that, while it has some explanatory
force, the efficient competition narrative is not the complete story.
Law-and-economics-based competition theory should not have a
monopoly on explanatory accounts of international commercial courts. This
Section draws again on the descriptive accounts in Part II to suggest additional
perspectives—through the lenses of local interests, law and political economy,
history, and geopolitics—for studying international commercial courts. Further
study through each of these lenses would add to the account in Part II to explain
what drives the creation of international commercial courts.
322
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Local interests. As the discussion in Part II reveals, in each State, there
is likely a more complicated domestic political economy driving, or blocking,
the creation of international commercial courts. For example, Brexit has been a
catalyst, as Alexandre Biard put it when describing France, but Brexit propelled
machinations already in the making.325 It is worth asking: who stands to benefit
from the establishment of these courts?
International commercial courts may be trying to cater to a local rather
than global clientele—and that local constituency may be lawyers rather than
businesses.326 In other contexts, scholars have noted that lawyers have strong
incentives to lobby States to supply new legal “products” that will generate
revenues for the lawyers.327 This might be an accurate account of the evolution
of the New York Commercial Division and other U.S. business courts.328 Further
research may reveal similar origin stories among some of the courts discussed
here, especially in Europe. Interestingly, while the Qatar, Dubai, and Singapore
examples generate business for local lawyers, they also employ a fair number of
foreign judges and foreign lawyers, who may practice before the courts.329 The
CICC, of course, relies heavily on Chinese lawyers, judges, and experts.
Aspiring litigation destinations may be particularly solicitous of the
interests of local lawyers and of building a local legal economy that caters to a
global market. Investment-minded courts—and, of course, China—may likewise
follow local political economic factors that seek geopolitical influence through
the establishment of an international commercial court.
As further evidence of the influence of local considerations, within
Europe, an EU-wide European Commercial Court might compete more
effectively with London330 than a proliferation of courts on the Continent. But
such a court has not yet materialized and faces substantial legal and political
obstacles.331 Instead, localities are establishing their own national options that
permit English-language proceedings and cling to their own procedural cultures
in different ways and to different degrees, often privileging local lawyers.332 This
325
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evidence suggests that international commercial courts—especially the aspiring
litigation destinations in Europe—are responding to local forces, rather than (or
at least in addition to) global competition.
Law and political economy. Questions of law and political economy rely
on “the insight that ‘the economy’ cannot be separated from questions of power,
distribution, and democracy.”333 In Belgium and the Netherlands, the legislative
debates about whether to create international commercial courts reflect an
appreciation that these courts would cater to the largest business interests. These
courts often require large amounts in controversy and purport to offer gold-star
standards of adjudication, potentially leaving other parts of the judiciary
unfunded or otherwise neglected. The potential for capture by repeat players or
parties to international commercial contracts with the stronger bargaining
power—including potentially state-owned companies—leads to further reasons
to question the benefits that these courts may offer when viewed through a law
and political economy lens.
Sociology. Sociological institutional theory, sometimes called
“institutional isomorphism,” posits that driving forces behind legal and
institutional innovations and borrowing can take on various forms besides
competition, such as outside pressure, a desire for legitimacy, and “the influence
of formal education and professional networks in disseminating ideas.”334
Diffusion theory states that diverse laws spread through various mechanisms
such as mimicry and learning in addition to competition.335
These various theories likely have some salience in the story behind the
proliferation of these courts. Investment-minded courts in particular seem driven
by a desire for legitimacy as much as, if not more than, competition for cases.
As shown in Part II, furthermore, new international commercial courts and
scholars alike routinely cite the London Commercial Court as an inspiration and
the DIFC court as a trendsetter in this area. Chronologically, the courts have
sprung up in relatively quick succession around the world: Dubai (2004), Qatar
(2009), France (2010), Singapore (2015), Germany (2018), China (2018), the
Netherlands (2019), and most recently, Kazakhstan (2019). While a full
exploration of this sociological theory is outside the scope of this Article, Part II
contributes to the plausibility of such accounts as explaining the rise of
international commercial courts. This account could “compete” with the
competition theory, and it complements accounts that incorporate the influence
of local interests as well as law and political economy perspectives.
History. A full understanding of the origins of international commercial
courts would also benefit greatly from historical accounts of legal institutions in
333
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these host States, especially historic treaty ports in Asia. The concept of local
courts designed for foreigners did not originate with international commercial
courts. Treaty ports had courts established by foreigners for foreigners. By
contrast, international commercial courts are established by locals for foreigners;
but, like treaty port courts, they still integrate foreign, often common law,
traditions and are interested in making foreign investment more secure.336
Studying this history would likely yield fascinating results that would also
complement the other lenses.
Geopolitics. From today’s perspective, the international commercial
courts with the most potential for influence are in Asia.337 For example,
emphasizing and developing neutrality and expertise, Singapore seems to be
trying to establish itself as a neutral “Switzerland” of dispute resolution for both
litigation and arbitration, building on its leadership in other service areas like
manufacturing, transportation, shipping, and financial services.338 For dispute
resolution, there may still be questions about Singapore courts’ neutrality in
cases involving the government, but they have established an excellent
reputation for following the rules of law in international commercial
adjudication.339
China, however, seems to be flexing its muscles most obviously. It will
be important to watch whether the CICC emerges as a leader in international
commercial dispute innovation or as a cost of doing business with the Belt and
Road Initiative. The CICC’s jurisdiction is not entirely consent-based and some
have raised concerns that incorporating various forms of ADR will make parties
feel compelled to submit to mediation or arbitration.340 Technically, “the CICC
is not mandatory for BRI deals; rather it is one option amongst an increasingly
competitive field of dispute resolution forums in Asia.”341 But even consentbased jurisdiction may take on a different valence if China exercises its
considerable bargaining power in Belt-and-Road-related projects to effectively
require parties to designate the CICC for resolution of disputes arising out of
those contracts.342 If the Chinese do pressure counterparties to accept CICC
jurisdiction, that may lead to a flow of cases to the court. With those cases, the
CICC will be able to gain experience—but the cases will also offer the CICC the
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opportunity to gain or lose the world’s trust.343 As The Economist noted,
reporting on the CICC’s first hearings:
[t]oo many belt-and-road contracts are secretive, unequal and
reward local power-brokers in opaque ways, reflecting deep
cynicism about global norms. Some experts wonder if China
secretly envies the ability of American judges in civil suits to
demand the seizure of assets on the other side of the world.
Though Chinese officials denounce America as a bully with a
long reach, some scholars wonder whether China might one
day begin issuing more extraterritorial judgments of its own.344
More broadly, international commercial courts also present a framework
through which to view the evolving geopolitical order. Perhaps these courts
represent an effort to oust London and New York from their traditional position
of dominance in the international commercial litigation space. But the more
nuanced view is that the goal, or at least a satisfactory result, may not be for
Singapore or Amsterdam to replace these standard-bearers as a go-to forum
globally, but instead to establish regional prominence and to prevent the flight
of local disputes to those far-flung jurisdictions. As noted earlier, balkanization
may be the goal, or at least an acceptable second-best result.
The opportunity for these potential power-grabs may be emerging in
part because of the weakening of London and New York’s status as the paragon
of legal stability. It may be not only the Brexit vote, but the chaos that followed
it, that opens up the field for others to assert themselves in various subsections
of the market. A weakened United States on the world stage likewise has
ramifications for New York’s prominence as an adjudication hub. New York’s
prominence is also affected by Supreme Court development of “litigation
isolationism”—doctrines that keep transnational cases out of U.S. courts—
including in ways that keep out arbitration-related litigation.345
These developments can affect not only London and New York’s ability
to attract adjudication business, but also the ability of English and New York law
to govern international commercial transactions. To date, international
commercial courts seem to be selling themselves for selection in choice-offorum clauses, but not necessarily for designation in choice-of-law clauses. Even
if Singapore and Dubai courts are interpreting cases under contracts that
designate English law, that exerts a certain influence over the development of
that law.346 And over time, it seems likely that some of these courts, especially
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in Asia, will exert influence over not only procedural questions, but substantive
ones as well.
IV.

LITIGATION VS. ARBITRATION

The rise of international commercial courts also sheds light on common
assumptions about the relationship between litigation and arbitration.
International commercial courts provide an important rebuttal to assumptions
that litigation and arbitration are starkly contrasting modes of dispute resolution
and they offer potential insights into scholarly debates about the forum
preferences of parties to international commercial contracts.
A. Understanding the Differences between Litigation and Arbitration
The rise of international commercial courts described in Part II
undermines traditional conceptions about the differences between litigation and
arbitration and the relationship between them. According to the conventional
U.S. understanding, often articulated in Supreme Court decisions, litigation and
arbitration are opposite forms of dispute resolution that exist in an antagonistic
relationship toward each other. International commercial courts reveal that
litigation and arbitration, which historically may have had many distinctive
characteristics, appear to be converging in certain ways.347 This discussion leads
to questions about what remains distinctive about litigation and arbitration.
International commercial courts offer at least three lessons on this
theme. First, they demonstrate a complementary relationship between courts and
arbitration (and other forms of ADR): that together they can support “one-stop
shopping” for dispute resolution in a single location. Second, these courts reveal
procedural convergence between international commercial litigation and
arbitration, undermining accounts that litigation and arbitration are starkly
contrasting modes of dispute resolution. Third, these courts show that there are,
nevertheless, salient distinctions between litigation and arbitration.
The first point is a contrast between the U.S. federal courts’ perspective
and these global trends. The U.S. Supreme Court is well known for its “liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements”348 and for its hostility to
litigation.349 But much of the rest of the world, including New York, recognizes
that welcoming multiple variations on dispute resolution can increase a locality’s
attractiveness to business generally and to the adjudication business in particular.
Singapore’s focus on developing itself as a legal hub for litigation, arbitration,
and ADR is a prime example.
These developments suggest that the Supreme Court’s attitude toward
arbitration and litigation as opposites and antagonists is misplaced. In previous
347
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work, I have explained how courts provide an important support network for
arbitration: recognizing and enforcing arbitration agreements and awards, and
otherwise supporting ongoing arbitration by, for example, helping direct the
collection of evidence or appointing arbitrators where parties cannot agree.350
And I have argued that to be “arbitration-friendly,” U.S. federal courts should
embrace a deeper understanding of the role of courts in supporting arbitration
when crafting both arbitration law and access-to-court doctrines.
The international trends discussed here suggest there is another
dimension to courts’ support for arbitration: the usefulness of providing courts,
arbitration, and other forms of ADR together as complementary offerings for
dispute resolution. These insights are useful for New York and other U.S.
jurisdictions to consider when structuring their courts to attract adjudication
business.
Second, in international commercial disputes, the conventional
distinctions between arbitration and litigation are dissolving. Neither arbitration
nor litigation has a monopoly on the procedures once thought to belong to one
or the other, like confidentiality, discovery, expert adjudicators, or appellate
review.351 It is already well known that arbitration is increasingly “judicialized,”
looking more and more like international commercial litigation.352
The study here demonstrates that international commercial litigation is
also becoming more “arbitrationalized.”353 Many international commercial
courts are designed to offer some of the most attractive aspects of arbitration and
also to satisfy some of arbitration’s shortcomings (like jurisdiction over third
parties). They offer English-language proceedings, three-judge panels,354 and
expert judges. Although parties may not select their particular judges by name,
they do know that their judge will be selected from a slate of experts listed on
the court’s website. Moreover, unlike in arbitration, where it can be difficult to
find time on a busy arbitrator’s calendar, courts offer judges’ prompt availability
(at least for now).355
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These courts also offer options for confidentiality. Court proceedings
are typically open to the public and opinions are usually published.356 That is the
default status for new international commercial courts, but they offer varying
degrees of confidentiality in both proceedings and opinions.357
Many of these courts are unabashedly open to private customization of
procedure.358 Parties can opt out of standard procedures, including the rules of
evidence or appellate review.359 Although creatures of the State, these
international commercial courts are also highly receptive to criticism from
private parties, as the quick changes to Singapore’s procedure demonstrate.
Putting aside the problem of determining whether arbitration is public
or private law,360 the fundamental distinction between litigation and arbitration
is often thought of as the difference between public and private adjudication, or
between State-mandated procedures and party-designed or party-designated
ones, or between confidential proceedings and public ones, or between consentbased jurisdiction and State-power-based ones.361 These distinctions are
becoming more elusive.362 The design of international commercial courts has the
hallmarks of a joint public-private enterprise.
The third point, however, is that some differences, of course, remain.363
Courts can join third parties and issue injunctive relief, for example, which
arbitral tribunals typically cannot do. They can exert jurisdiction over nonconsenting parties. Singapore, in particular, seems to offer these capabilities as
a way to contrast with arbitration. But it is unclear what the international law
356
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boundaries are on international commercial courts’ authority over nonconsenting third parties.364
One important distinction is courts’ ability to declare what the law is
and to create binding precedent. Indeed, many judges and commenters have
lamented arbitration’s popularity because it has hampered courts’ ability to
develop substantive law.365 This may be less of a problem in civil law traditions,
where the law depends less heavily on judicial opinions and precedent.366 But
commenters in the U.K., the United States, and other common law jurisdictions
have recognized this effect of arbitration’s growing popularity as a serious
issue.367
It is unclear what role international commercial courts will play in the
development of substantive law. For the most part, the new courts discussed here
are offering adjudication services, not lawmaking services.368 They promise to
enforce parties’ choice-of-law provisions and offer procedures to make proving
foreign law easier. But how this works in practice remains to be seen. A foreign
court applying English common law (because it was designated in a choice-oflaw clause) would not contribute to the development of the English common law
per se, because these interpretations are not precedential.369.
But foreign court interpretations might contribute to a common law
more generally. Some suggest that these courts may contribute to the “continuum
of precedential decisions.”370 Justice Middleton of the Federal Court of Australia
has argued for “harmonization” of substantive laws, practices, and ethics in
international commerce. Arbitration, he contended, cannot do this, and it is not
supposed to.371 Chief Judge Menon of the SICC has said that developing
transnational commercial law is a goal of that institution.
That will be a possibility, however, only if the decisions are made
public. The courts discussed here seem to value publicity and confidentiality to
different degrees. The SICC, for example, permits parties to select confidential
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proceedings. The CICC showcased open proceedings in its first hearings.372 Both
the CICC and the NCC plan to make judgments available online.373 Qatar, the
DIFC, and the AGDM all have open court proceedings, and the DIFC posts
videos of its proceedings on its website.374 But proof of the transparency and
publicity of these courts will be in the pudding. Confidential proceedings likely
will yield confidential decisions. And it is unclear how transparent courts will be
about their confidential docket items or their decision-making processes for
granting confidentiality requests.
In arbitration, meanwhile, there are heated debates about confidentiality
as well.375 These norms appear to be shifting and it is unclear where the fault
lines will come to rest. For those watching for possible convergence between
litigation and arbitration, it is interesting to note that other commenters propose
allowing arbitration to establish precedent under certain circumstances.376 This
would further elide distinctions between litigation and arbitration.
B. Party Preferences
The proliferation of international commercial courts also raises
questions about parties’ presumed preferences for private dispute resolution,
especially arbitration.377 Some empirical studies of contracts have worked
toward debunking the assumption that parties to international commercial
contracts mostly choose arbitration.378 The emergence of new international
commercial courts could further undermine that understanding.379 On the other
hand, it could be that the rise of international commercial courts reflects local
lawyers’ or other constituencies’ interests, and may not reflect party
preferences—or, at least, not reflect preferences that are strong enough to
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overcome traditional transaction costs or lack of attention that often leads to
parties omitting or neglecting forum selection clauses in their contracts.
One may wish to wait for further information on the courts’ popularity
before drawing conclusions about party preferences. Doing so should require
establishing, at the outset, what the markers of success or popularity should be,
and over what timeline. As discussed above, however, it is likely that different
courts will have different, and sometimes changing, metrics of success.
In assessing party preferences, one must also be vigilant to consider the
role of consent to jurisdiction. Many of the courts discussed here, especially
those that do not require a connection to the locality as a basis for jurisdiction,
like the NCC, seem to rely primarily on consent-based jurisdiction. But
jurisdiction tends not to be limited to consent-based jurisdiction, and, indeed, one
of courts’ primary advantages over arbitration is the ability to consolidate cases,
join additional parties, and exercise jurisdiction without parties’ consent.380
These courts may test the boundaries of how far such jurisdiction can reach
extraterritorially.381
For example, thus far, the SICC has mostly relied on referrals from the
ordinary Singapore courts.382 Likewise, the CICC is not limited to consent-based
jurisdiction and has had cases referred by the SPC. Moreover, if consent to the
CICC’s jurisdiction becomes a condition of Chinese investment through the Belt
and Road Initiative, the CICC may gain prominence—but not necessarily
legitimacy—relatively quickly. As a lawyer with years of Chinese experience
told The Economist, “‘Where you go to resolve a dispute is more or less a
question of your bargaining power.’”383 The CICC’s bargaining position may
also allow it to retain control over its courts and potentially to circumvent treaty
agreements about investment dispute resolution. This dynamic may require
adjusting assumptions that forum-selection clauses reflect free choice and party
agreement—and, therefore, may require adjusting metrics for judging a
particular court’s “popularity.”
V.

EVALUATING INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL COURTS

This Part aims to begin conversations about the normative implications
of the proliferation of international commercial courts. Because the courts are so
new, there are more questions than answers.
On one hand, international commercial courts represent the vanguard of
innovation in international commercial dispute resolution. They seem to
represent the triumph of choice, competition, and innovation, as well as a
380
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convergence of norms around best practices in international commercial dispute
resolution. Courts and arbitral centers alike recognize the benefits of Englishlanguage proceedings, party control over procedure, confidentiality, the
availability of opting in or out of appellate review and other procedural rules,
three-judge panels, expert adjudicators, and deference to parties’ choice of law
and forum. Those courts that are part of new legal hubs may become home to a
synergistic interaction between litigation, arbitration, and other ADR
mechanisms.384 These developments could be understood to represent the fruits
of a positive kind of forum shopping whereby parties, through lobbying efforts,
advocacy by lawyers, and ultimately their choices in forum-selection clauses,
drive procedural innovation and reform.385 Ideally, improvements in judicial
processes in commercial courts will spread to other parts of the judiciary.386
Notably, moreover, most of the States studied here strongly embrace
arbitration on its own as well as in combination with litigation (and other forms
of ADR); they seem to recognize the complementarity between courts and
arbitration. How this will operate in practice remains to be seen. For now,
China’s CICC recognizes cooperation with only Chinese arbitration centers. If
they open their cooperative stance to include foreign or international arbitration
centers, that may assuage some fears that China’s main priority is to assert
further State control over dispute resolution. But China faces an uphill battle at
ensuring integrity and freedom from political corruption and influence.387
Despite some reasons for optimism, more complicated dynamics drive
these developments, with unclear results. Some of these courts may disappear
over time from neglect, lack of use, or reduced support from host States. But if
they continue and build substantial dockets, there are two sets of possible
concerns. First, international commercial courts could represent potentially
troubling trends towards a reassertion of State sovereignty in an area that has
recently seemed to be dominated by private arbitration. In this context, at least
some international commercial courts, most prominently the CICC, may create
new environments for flexing disparate bargaining power or exerting State
control. In this sense, international commercial courts may reveal a reassertion
of State sovereignty and a rejection of both arbitration and globalization. Today,
some arbitration scholars fear that the rising trend of economic nationalism
threatens States’ support for arbitration.388 The rise of international commercial
courts could be a piece of that puzzle, representing State efforts to reject
arbitration and replace it with these courts, which might be more sympathetic to
384
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State interests, particularly as they rely on host State support for their
existence.389 Proponents of international commercial courts also have touted
them as institutions to develop transnational commercial law, in contrast to
arbitration, which has not been able to declare and develop law in these areas. If
they do seize on the ability to develop law, international commercial courts
should be careful not to favor government parties or government interests, but
also not to cater too much to the repeat players before them.
This caution relates to the other set of concerns about international
commercial courts, which is that instead of catering to sovereign interests, these
courts could become captured by private interests. International commercial
courts’ resemblance to arbitration may be troubling for the same reasons that
scholars worry about arbitration replacing courts in the United States:390 they
could represent a new way of privatizing public courts. In this sense,
international commercial courts may become less public or less interested in law
declaration in the general public interest; they may focus their legal analysis
more on the interests of the parties regularly before them and they may
concentrate court resources on a few cases with high amounts in controversy.
They may subordinate other judicial roles to resolving disputes according to
parties’ preferred procedures, competing for adjudication business, and catering
to potential plaintiffs. If that happens, public court values and functions will
suffer. Likewise, it remains to be seen whether international commercial courts
will follow the lead of other specialized courts that have fallen victim to
incentives to cater only to certain parties, leaving other interests of justice to the
side.391 One criticism of arbitration is that sometimes it can prize efficiency over
fairness;392 international commercial courts should not.
In sum, as they develop, international commercial courts should be wary
of both this Scylla of State abuse of power and the Charybdis of private capture.
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CONCLUSION
The recent proliferation of international commercial courts calls into
doubt many conventional assumptions about the global market for adjudication,
the relationship between arbitration and litigation, and the differences between
the two. It belies accounts of courts competing in a “race to the top,” of litigation
and arbitration being diametrically opposed options for dispute resolution, and
of parties to international commercial contracts “always” opting for arbitration.
This Article advocates understanding and studying the rise of these courts not
just through the law and economics lens of competition among courts and arbitral
tribunals for the business of adjudication, but also with other scholarly
methodologies. Further study, moreover, will yield insights for a number of
additional literatures, including the literature on the role of lawyers as forces for
legal and institutional change, the role of culture in procedure, the role of forum
shopping in shaping courts as institutions, the role of courts in an evolving
geopolitical order, and the role of the United States in the global adjudication
business.

